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Abstract
This thesis examine three distinct aspects of the labour market integration of immigrants and
their children in the host country.
The ﬁrst chapter looks at the early careers of immigrants to shed light on the mechanisms
driving the immigrant wage growth in the ﬁrst years in the host country. I use a unique linked
employer employee panel covering all wage earners in the private sector in Portugal to follow
the careers of immigrant men. I show that in the ﬁrst ten years in the country immigrants close
one third of the initial immigrant-native wage gap and that one third of this wage catch-up is
accounted for by immigrants gaining access to better paying ﬁrms. I then suggest an economic
assimilation mechanism which highlights imperfect information about immigrant productivity
and show that its predictions are in line with the data.
The second chapter oﬀers a longer term perspective of the economic assimilation of immi-
grants by turning to the labour market performance of the second generation. The chapter
uses a unique survey of children of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and ex-Yugoslavia, and
children of natives in 15 European cities to closely compare their educational and labor market
outcomes. Although the second generation performs on average worse than the children of na-
tives in most outcomes considered, all diﬀerences are explained by diﬀerences in socio-economic
background.
While the ﬁrst chapter focused on the dynamics of the wage gap over time, the third chapter
studies the diﬀerences in the level of the wage gap across immigrant populations. The chapter
provides a comparison of the wage gaps by country of origin in two major host countries, the
UK and the US, in order to disentangle country of origin eﬀects from immigrant selection. I
show that the wage gaps by country of origin are strongly correlated in the two host countries
and that virtually all the correlation is accounted for by diﬀerences in country of origin speciﬁc
returns to education.
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Preface
13% of the OECD population in 2010 was foreign-born. The literature on the economic as-
similation of immigrants studies how people born abroad, and often educated abroad, adapt to
the host country labour market. How do immigrants perform in the labour market compared
to natives? How does the performance change as time goes by? A motivation for migrating
often invoked by labour migrants is the possibility of a better life for their oﬀspring: how do
immigrants’ children fare compared to natives but also to the ﬁrst generation? These are some
of the main questions addressed by the literature.
Each chapter of this dissertation examines a distinct aspect of the labour market integration
of immigrants and their children in the host country. The ﬁrst chapter looks at the early careers
of immigrants in Portugal to measure the wage catch up in the ﬁrst years in the country and
understand the mechanisms behind the wage growth. The second chapter analysis the long-
term integration of immigrants by comparing the outcomes of the children of immigrants to the
natives in European cities. The third chapter compares immigrants by country of origin in two
major host countries, the UK and the US, to better understand the widely documented fact
that the country of origin is a main predictor of the wages of immigrants in the host country.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I focus on the labour market integration of immigrant men in the ﬁrst
years in the host country. I use a unique linked employer employee panel covering all wage
earners in the private sector in Portugal to follow the careers of immigrant men. I show that in
the ﬁrst ten years in the country immigrants close one third of the initial immigrant-native wage
gap and that one third of this wage catch-up is accounted for by ﬁrm heterogeneity. Immigrants
remain in the same occupations but gain access to jobs in better paying ﬁrms. Over time
immigrants move to ﬁrms that are larger, more productive and have a higher share of native
workers. These patterns are similar for all the recent immigrants irrespective of their origin
and in particular of whether their mother tongue is the host country’s language. Motivated
by these new stylized facts, I suggest an economic assimilation mechanism which highlights
imperfect information about immigrant productivity. I build an employer learning model with
ﬁrm heterogeneity and complementarities between worker and ﬁrm type. The initial uncertainty
over immigrants’ productivity prevents them from gaining access to the best jobs. Over time,
productivity is revealed and immigrants obtain better ﬁrm matches. I derive predictions on
the immigrant wage distributions over time, on their mobility patterns and on the productivity
distribution of the ﬁrms they are matched with. The predictions of the model are in line with
the data and are not trivially derived from competing explanations.
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In the second chapter, I focus on a much longer time horizon. The decision to migrate
takes into account not only the welfare of the migrant himself but also that of his family. The
assimilation of the second generation is sometimes considered the best indicator of immigrant
assimilation. There are several reasons why immigrants may not be expected to perform as well
as comparable natives in the labour market. The question of the integration of the children of
immigrants in the host country labour market is a very diﬀerent issue from the integration of
the ﬁrst generation. The children of immigrants are raised in the host country, go through the
same educational system than the natives and speak the host country language.
The chapter uses a unique survey of children of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and ex-
Yugoslavia, and children of natives in 15 European cities to closely compare their educational
and labor market outcomes. Although the second generation performs on average worse than
the children of natives in most outcomes considered, virtually all diﬀerences are accounted for
by diﬀerences in family background. Parents’ characteristics are also shown to be important
predictors of other outcomes besides educational and labour market outcomes, such as the inter-
marriage of the second generation. Children from lower socio-economic background marry more
often within the ethnic group. Moreover, the estimation of a simple intergenerational model of
human capital shows that in European cities there is less correlation between the outcomes of
parents and their children in immigrant than in native families.
While the ﬁrst chapter focuses on the dynamics of the wage gap over time and the possible
mechanisms behind the patterns observed, chapter three focuses on the diﬀerences in the levels
of the wage gap across immigrant populations.
The chapter provides a comparison of the wage gaps by country of origin in two major host
countries, the UK and the US. It is a well established fact in the literature that the country of
origin is an important predictor of the wages of immigrants in the host country. It is nevertheless
not clear why this is the case. On the one hand, there are characteristics of the country of origin
that may make the workers more productive in any labour market, such as the quality of the
educational system. On the other hand the selection of immigrants into a given host country
diﬀers by country of origin. The aim in this chapter is to compare immigrants from the same
country of origin in two host countries to disentangle the diﬀerent eﬀects. I ﬁrst show that there
is a strong correlation between the wages of immigrants relative to that of natives by country
of origin in the two host countries. Diﬀerences in returns to years of education by country of
origin account for virtually all of the observed correlation. There is nevertheless a large part
of the wage diﬀerences across countries of origin that remains unexplained by the country of
origin eﬀects.
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Chapter 1
The Careers of Immigrants
1.1 Introduction
Over the past thirty years, the literature on the economic assimilation of immigrants has focused
on measuring the immigrant-native wage gap and the speed at which the gap closes with time
spent in the host country. According to Chiswick (1978) immigrants earnings’ would equal
and then exceed the natives’ after 10 to 15 years of residence. Although this estimate has been
shown to be overly optimistic, there is widespread evidence that immigrant wages catch up with
the natives over time. Duleep and Dowhan (2002) and Lubotsky (2007) in particular present
evidence using longitudinal data for the US.
A number of potential explanations for the wage catch-up have been proposed. Eckstein and
Weiss (2004) summarize the channels through which immigrants assimilate as follows: ”With
the passage of time in the host country, immigrants invest in local human capital and search for
better matches with local employers, and employers become less uncertain of the immigrant’s
potential and realized quality.” Similar explanations are mentioned in Chiswick (1978), Borjas
(2000) and LaLonde and Topel (1997). This quote refers to three models of the distribution of
earnings which may be used to explain immigrant economic assimilation: a human capital, a
search and matching and an employer learning model.
Surprisingly no research has focused on studying the relative importance of these channels.
In fact, most empirical studies of immigrant wages start from a generic statement of the human
capital model1 and focus mainly on measuring the immigrant catch-up rate. Within the human
capital framework, several contributions highlight the importance of diﬀerent factors, such as
speaking the host country language (Chiswick and Miller (1995)), the age at arrival in the
host country (Friedberg (1992)) or the country of origin (Chiswick (1978),Borjas (2000)) in
explaining the immigrant wage catch-up. However, no systematic attempt has been made to
diﬀerentiate between immigrant economic assimilation channels.
1Borjas (2000) shows how diﬀerent assumptions made on the human capital production function may lead
to very diﬀerent predictions in terms of immigrant wage patterns. Few papers take the human capital model
seriously to investigate the mechanisms further. An exception is Eckstein and Weiss (2004) who assume an
exogenous increase in the returns to immigrants’ skills and model the investment in human capital with time
spent in the host country.
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This chapter is a ﬁrst step to address this gap in the literature. I use a unique linked
employer-employee panel to study the early careers of immigrants in Portugal. The contribution
of this chapter is two-fold. First, exploiting the richness of the data, I document new immigrant
assimilation patterns in the ﬁrst years in the host country. In particular, I show that job mobility
and ﬁrm heterogeneity play an important role in the assimilation process. Second, motivated
by the stylized facts, I build an economic assimilation model based on employer learning with
ﬁrm heterogeneity and complementarities between worker and ﬁrm type. I derive additional
predictions from the model and show that they are in line with the patterns in the data and
that they can not be trivially explained by a search and matching or human capital model.
I start the empirical analysis by measuring the immigrant wage catch-up rate. I document
that upon arrival immigrants earn 34% less than natives of the same age and 16% less than
natives of the same age working in the same region, industry and occupation. I show that the
gap closes at a rate of 1 percentage point per year spent in the country. As I use a panel which
covers virtually all workers in the private sector, selection concerns are reduced. Estimates with
and without individual ﬁxed eﬀects are very similar showing that selection is not a major concern
in this context. This estimate of the wage catch up is in line with the literature for the US.
For instance, Lubotsky (2007), using longitudinal social security data, shows that immigrants’
earnings catch up with the natives at a rate of 10 to 15 percentage points in 20 years.
Accounting for immigrant sorting across regions, industries and occupations does not change
the estimated catch up rate signiﬁcantly. Immigrants do not assimilate by changing occupations
and moving to diﬀerent industries. However, this chapter shows that they do assimilate by
switching ﬁrms. In fact, the ﬁrst years in the country are characterized by a very high job
mobility rate and one third of the immigrant wage catch up is linked to moving to better
paying ﬁrms. This ﬁnding relates to a small but growing literature which measures how the
sorting of immigrants across ﬁrms relates to the wage gap between immigrants and natives.
Evidence for Canada2 indicates that wage diﬀerences between ﬁrms are more important than
diﬀerences within ﬁrms in explaining the immigrant-native wage gap. I build on this literature
and show that moving to better paying ﬁrms is an important channel through which immigrants
move up the wage distribution.3
I then use the rich information in the data to focus more directly on the role of ﬁrms in
the assimilation process. Over time, immigrants move to bigger and more productive ﬁrms and
get access to longer term contracts. Immigrants tend to start their careers in ﬁrms with a high
proportion of immigrant workers and over time they move to ﬁrms with a higher share of native
workers.
Moreover, I show that the wage catch up and ﬁrm mobility patterns are very similar for
2See Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2009)
3Pendakur and Woodcock (2009) ﬁnd evidence that immigrants who have spent more years in the host country
work in less segregated and better paying ﬁrms than recent immigrants. However they are unable to rule out that
this result may be driven by diﬀerences in characteristics of diﬀerent cohorts of immigrants or by self-selection in
out-migration. I estimate the wage regressions with ﬁrm and worker ﬁxed eﬀects, which allows to separate the
eﬀects.
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all the recent immigrants irrespective of their origin and in particular of whether their mother
tongue is Portuguese. This result is at odds with a human capital accumulation explanation
of the wage catch up. One would expect immigrants who speak the language to suﬀer a lower
wage penalty to begin with but also to catch up more slowly.
Motivated by this new set of empirical facts on immigrant careers, I suggest an economic
assimilation mechanism which highlights imperfect information about the productivity of im-
migrants. The model presented is an employer learning model with ﬁrm heterogeneity and
complementarities between worker and ﬁrm type. It builds on the employer learning model by
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Lange (2007). These models assume that ﬁrms are homoge-
neous and that workers are paid their expected marginal productivity, which is independent of
the ﬁrm they work for. I introduce ﬁrm heterogeneity and an assignment mechanism to allocate
workers to ﬁrms. The mechanism considered is similar to the one in the diﬀerential rents model
presented in Sattinger (1993). Each ﬁrm hires one worker and workers are assigned to ﬁrms
according to their expected productivity given the information available at the time. As there
are complementarities between worker and ﬁrm productivity, workers with higher expected
productivity are assigned to more productive ﬁrms.4
The focus of the model is on the uncertainty: I assume that the only diﬀerence between
immigrants and natives entering the labour market is that there is more uncertainty about
immigrants’ productivity than about natives’. I consider this to be a reasonable assumption:
Typically it is easier for employers to judge the skills of a native than those of an immigrant.
For instance, the evaluation of prior experience and education is less straightforward in the case
of immigrants.
In the model, ﬁrms produce subject to decreasing returns to skill and thus value certainty
over worker productivity. This prevents immigrants from getting access to the more productive
ﬁrms in the ﬁrst years in the host country. With time spent in the labour market, the uncertainty
over worker productivity decreases and workers get matched on average to more productive
ﬁrms.
The predictions of the model on the mean wages and the job mobility patterns are in line
with the stylized facts. The learning model also has strong predictions on the evolution of the
distribution of immigrant wages over time, and in particular on the variance of wages. I take
these predictions to the data and study the variance of wages of immigrants and natives entering
the market in the same year over time. The variance of the log wages is higher for natives than
for immigrants and increasing for both groups over time. I show that ﬁrm heterogeneity accounts
for a signiﬁcant part of the increase in the variance of log wages. These results are in line with
the predictions of the model.
Finally, I show that the results are not trivially derived from a competing search and match-
ing or human capital explanation.
4Two papers who combine complementarities in the production function and employer learning are Gibbons
et al. (2005) and Groes et al. (2010). The complementarity I am assuming is between worker and ﬁrm type,
whereas in these papers they refer to industry and worker type and occupation and worker type.
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Section 2 of the chapter describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics on the
immigrant population. Section 3 documents immigrant assimilation patterns. In section 4, I
present an employer learning model with ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity and derive predictions
on the distribution of immigrant wages. Section 5 compares the distribution of wages for
immigrants over time against the predictions from the model and section 6 discusses other
possible assimilation mechanisms and how they compare to the patterns in the data. Concluding
remarks are presented in section 7.
1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.2.1 Data, Context and Sample Selection
Every year in November, ﬁrms registered in Portugal must hand in a detailed questionnaire
(‘Quadros de Pessoal’) to the Portuguese Ministry of Labour. This process is mandatory for all
ﬁrms in the private sector employing at least one wage earner. With the exception of the public
service and domestic workers, virtually all wage earners in the Portuguese economy are covered
by the survey. The questionnaire contains detailed information about the ﬁrm (the location,
the volume of sales, the industry, etc.), the establishment (the location, the number of workers,
the collective bargaining agreement, the industry, etc.) and the worker (age, gender, education,
nationality, etc.). All workers, ﬁrms and establishments have a unique identiﬁer which allows
to track them over the years.
When a worker is not in the panel in a given year, it is impossible to distinguish whether he
is unemployed, working in the public sector or in the informal sector. In the case of immigrants,
in particular, when a worker drops out of the panel, it is impossible to know whether he has
migrated to the home country (or to a third country).
Portugal, like Italy, Spain or Greece, has been an emigration country for most of the last
century and this trend has only been reversed in the last 10 years. These traditional emigration
countries are now experiencing large inﬂows of immigration. Net migration numbers between
2000 and 2007 are striking: there are an additional 4.6m legal immigrants in Spain, 2.6m in
Italy and close to half a million in Portugal and Greece.5 In order to deal with the large
inﬂow of undocumented immigrants, the Portuguese government organized an ”extraordinary
regularization” in 2001. The foreign legal population in Portugal increased by 69% in that year.
Approximately 183,000 individuals got a permit to live in the country for a year. The permits
were renewable up to four times. After ﬁve years, immigrants could apply for a long-term
residence permit. Having a work contract in Portugal was the main condition to obtain and
renew a short-term residence permit. In 2003, bilateral agreements were signed with Brazil
which allowed Brazilian immigrants residing in Portugal before July 2003 to obtain a long-term
residence permit. Although there has been no major regularization programme since 2003,
immigrants may apply for a residence permit if they are in the country, have a work contract
5These numbers represent respectively 10.5%, 4.2%, 3.7% and 2.7% of the countries’ total populations in 2007,
according to Eurostat.
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and are registered with the social security.
I restrict the analysis to immigrants from the new immigration wave, that is immigrants who
enter the labour market after 2001. In 2000, only 0.5% of workers in the data are immigrants,
in 2002 immigrants represent 4% of workers. The data set covers only workers in the formal
sector. As there is no direct information on the years immigrants have spent in the country,
I build a proxy which indicates the ﬁrst year the immigrant appears in the data, that is the
ﬁrst year the immigrant has a job in the formal sector. In all the analysis, the variable ”years
since migration”, YSM, refers to years in formal employment, and the ”cohort” the immigrant
belongs to is the ﬁrst year he is tracked in the data.
Figure 1.1 shows the mean hourly wages for the diﬀerent cohorts of immigrants over time.
The trend in mean wages is similar for all cohorts. The 2002 cohort captures a high proportion
of the immigrants who took advantage of the 2001 regularization. These immigrants may have
been working informally in the country in the previous years.6 One may thus be concerned that
this cohort is unusual. The trend in mean wages of the 2002 cohort is nevertheless similar to
the other cohorts which eases this concern.
I use the information in the data on the workers’ nationality to deﬁne immigrants as for-
eigners. In the short run naturalization is not an issue, since immigrants need at least six years
of legal residence to be able to apply for Portuguese citizenship.7
I restrict the analysis to immigrant men. Women represent less than 30% of immigrant
observations in the data and would need a separate analysis. Immigrant women in Portugal
often get jobs as domestic workers and are hence not covered in the data. I restrict the sample
used to native and immigrant men. In the 2002-2009 period, I follow the early careers of close
to 120,000 immigrant men.
1.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
The immigrants considered in the data are divided into three main origin groups, representing
more than 90% of the total number of immigrant observations: Immigrants from Eastern and
South Eastern Europe (Eastern Europeans, in the text), Brazil, and the former Portuguese
African colonies (Africa)8.
Graphics 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the number of immigrants in the data each year; and the
number of immigrants who belong to each cohort, from 2002 until 2009. After the large increase
of foreign legal residents in Portugal in 2001, the number of immigrants continued to increase.
With worsening labour market conditions, the inﬂow of immigrants slowed down after 2005 and
the stock of foreigners in the data actually decreased in 2006 and 2009. The representation of the
main origin groups has also changed over the years. Immigrants from Eastern Europe are the
group which took greatest advantage of the 2001 regularization (101,000 permits), in particular
6Detailed information on the construction of the panel and the variables is in the appendix.
7Also, if an individual is foreign for ﬁve years and then becomes Portuguese, he is considered to be an
immigrant for the analysis. More details on the construction of the panel are presented in the appendix.
8The exact deﬁnitions of the groups are in the appendix. Immigrants from the EU15 represent 4.5% of
immigrant observations and are excluded from the analysis.
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citizens from the Ukraine (65,000 permits) and Moldova. The number of immigrants from
Eastern Europe entering the country declined sharply over the years and, as ﬁgure 1.2 shows,
even the stock of Eastern European immigrants is in decline. Brazilians started migrating
later to Portugal, and by 2009 are the biggest of the three groups in terms of new migrants.
Since 2007 Brazil is the most common citizenship of immigrants residing legally in Portugal.
Immigrants from Africa are the oldest immigrant community in Portugal. Although this group
also beneﬁted from the 2001 regularization, there has been immigration from Africa, mainly
from Cape Verde, since the 1980s. Until 2007 Cape Verdeans were the largest foreign community
in Portugal. The assimilation patterns of this group turn out to be slightly diﬀerent from those
of the immigrants from the recent immigration wave.
Selected descriptive statistics of the data used are presented in table 1.1. Immigrants are
younger than the native population, and they have worked in Portugal on average just a little
more than 3 years. Immigrant men are very concentrated in a small number of industries: con-
struction by itself accounts for more than 42% of the immigrant observations. Immigrants from
diﬀerent origin groups select into diﬀerent industries: 46% percent of the observations for men
from Eastern Europe and 56% from Africa are jobs in construction, whereas for Brazilians the
proportion is only 34%. Brazilian immigrants are more likely to work in hotels and restaurants.
Furthermore, immigrants from Eastern Europe are more evenly spread in the diﬀerent regions of
the country, whereas immigrants from Africa are very concentrated in the Lisbon metropolitan
area where the traditional community has settled since the 1980s.
1.3 The Economic Assimilation of Immigrants
1.3.1 Measuring the Wage Catch-up
The main question in the immigrant assimilation literature is whether the gap in wages immi-
grants experience upon arrival decreases with time spent in the host country. Following the
literature, I estimate equation (1.1) below by ordinary least squares. The log hourly wage of
worker i in job j in year t is given by:
ln(HW )ijt = αFGi + γY SMit +Xijtβ + ηi + ijt (1.1)
The dependent variable is the worker’s log hourly wage, FG is a dummy that indicates
whether the individual is an immigrant and Y SM are the years since migration. Y SM is set
to 0 for natives. The coeﬃcient α measures the immigrant-native wage gap and γ the rate at
which the gap decreases with years since migration9. I measure the wage gap and the wage
catch-up controlling ﬁrst only for a quartic in age, and then progressively controlling for region,
industry and occupation. This speciﬁcation is restrictive since it assumes that the returns to
characteristics are the same for immigrants and natives but nevertheless represents a useful
benchmark.
9Introducing higher order polynomials in YSM does not change the results. The eﬀect of years in the country
is close to linear in the ﬁrst ten years in the country.
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The results for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations are presented in table 1.2. The mean hourly wage
gap is 34.4% in the ﬁrst year and decreases by 0.9 percentage points with each year spent in
the country.10 Adjusting by diﬀerences in sorting across regions and industries reduces the
initial gap to 24.5% and accounting for occupational diﬀerences reduces the gap still further to
14.6%. More than half of the wage gap between natives and immigrants is due to diﬀerences in
immigrant sorting into diﬀerent regions, industries and occupations. The wage catch-up rate γ
however is very stable across speciﬁcations. This result shows that the immigrant wage catch-
up occurs within narrowly deﬁned regions, industries and occupations. In the ﬁrst years in the
country, immigrants have higher wage growth than natives of the same age. The catch-up is
not correlated to immigrants moving to diﬀerent industries or occupations over time.
Cross-sectional calculations of the catch-up rate tend to over-estimate immigrant assimila-
tion if more successful immigrants have a higher probability of remaining in the host country
and less successful ones return to their home countries. I estimate all the speciﬁcations with
individual ﬁxed eﬀects in order to address the selection concern. The results are presented in
the last three columns of table 1.2. Controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects also does not change
the γ signiﬁcantly which indicates that the bias due to self-selection in out-migration is not
a major concern in this context. Changing regions, industries and occupations is part of the
assimilation process. I therefore choose the speciﬁcation controlling only for a quartic in age
and individual ﬁxed eﬀects as my preferred speciﬁcation. The immigrant wage catch-up is set
at 1 percentage point per year. This estimate is similar to the estimates for the US using panel
data. Lubotsky (2007) evaluates the closing of the wage gap in the US at 10 to 15 percentage
points in 20 years.
Next, I run the regressions separately for diﬀerent origin groups. Table 1.3 presents the
preferred speciﬁcation, which controls only for a quartic in age, with and without individual
ﬁxed eﬀects, for the 3 main origin groups. The wage gap is similar for all origin groups. It is 6
percentage points lower for Brazilians than for immigrants from Eastern Europe. The gap for
immigrants from Africa lies in between. After accounting for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the wage
catch-up rate is slightly higher than 1 percentage point for Brazilians and Eastern Europeans
but immigrants from Africa lag substantially behind. These results show that speaking the host
country language may not be as important as one might have imagined for immigrant assimila-
tion. Eastern Europeans are the only immigrants whose mother tongue is not Portuguese, yet
their wage growth is comparable to the one experienced by Brazilians. The descriptive statistics
show that immigrants from Brazil self-select into diﬀerent sectors and occupations than Eastern
Europeans, but after this initial sorting the assimilation patterns are very similar.
1.3.2 A Distributional Approach
The previous results establish that there is immigrant wage catch-up as measured by the mean
hourly wages. Comparing the whole distribution of log hourly wages of immigrants and natives
10The variable YSM is set to 1 in the ﬁrst year an immigrant is in the country so the initial gap is −0.353 +
0.009 = −0.344
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shows that the distribution of wages of immigrants is becoming more similar to that of the
natives with time spent in Portugal. Figure 1.4 illustrates this point. The graphic shows the
representation of immigrant wages in the distribution of native wages by years since migration,
and more speciﬁcally in the entry year, after 5 years and 9 years in the country. For example,
in the ﬁrst year in the country on average 33% of immigrants earn less than the lowest decile
of the native distribution. After 5 years in the host country, less than 5% of immigrants do
so. With years spent in the country, the distribution of wages of immigrants widens and comes
closer to the native wage distribution.
The calculations in this section use all cohorts and all years pooled together. One might
worry that the results are confounded by cohort eﬀects and selection. To address this concern,
I do the same calculations for each cohort separately, for the whole cohort and for ”stayers”
only. I consider ”stayers” immigrants who can be tracked in the data each year. The graphics
in ﬁgure 1.5 show the results for the 2003 cohort. Immigrants move up the wage distribution
also when considering only ”stayers” of the same cohort. The results for all other cohorts and
origin groups are similar and presented in the web appendix.
These results show that over time immigrants move up the wage distribution. In the next
sections, I focus on a speciﬁc mechanism through which the catch up occurs: job mobility. I
ﬁrst estimate a linear probability model of job mobility; I then show that the wage catch up is
linked to immigrants moving to better ﬁrms; and ﬁnally I present descriptives on the ﬁrms that
immigrants work for over time.
1.3.3 Immigrant Job Mobility
A very strong empirical regularity in the data is that the immigrant job mobility is very high.
Table 1.4 presents results on a linear probability model of changing employers. The dependent
variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the worker-ﬁrm match will end in the next period, 0 if
the worker is still working for the same ﬁrm in the next period. Only workers who are in the
data in two consecutive years are considered in the analysis. On average 7% of native workers
change employers in a given year. The rate is much higher for immigrants : after the ﬁrst year
in the host country, 26% of immigrants change employers11. The probability of changing ﬁrms
for immigrants decreases by approximately 2.1 percentage points per year. In speciﬁcations
(3) to (5) of table 1.4, I introduce other variables in the model. In line with the literature on
job mobility, eg. Farber (1999), I control for a cubic in tenure and the current hourly wage in
column (3), and account for diﬀerences in sorting across regions and industries (column (4))
and occupations (column (5)). Immigrants have on average lower tenure, lower wages and work
in diﬀerent industries and occupations than natives. These diﬀerences account partly for the
diﬀerences in job mobility rates: there is nevertheless a remaining unexplained gap between
immigrants and natives.
11The variable YSM is set to 1 in the ﬁrst year an immigrant is in the country so the initial gap is 0.211−0.021 =
0.191
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1.3.4 The Role of Firms in Immigrant Assimilation
Introducing Firm Heterogeneity in the Wage Catch-up Estimations
Recent evidence from Canada12 indicates that the immigrant native wage gap is associated
to immigrant sorting across ﬁrms. Immigrants are not paid less than natives working in the
same ﬁrm, but are systematically concentrated in ﬁrms that pay less, holding worker and job
characteristics ﬁxed. In this section, I look at whether with time spent in the host country
immigrants move to ﬁrms that pay better, and if so, how much of the wage catch-up does this
upward mobility account for.
I introduce ﬁrm heterogeneity in the wage equation estimated in the previous section in
order to investigate whether the immigrant wage catch-up is related to immigrants moving
to better paying ﬁrms over time. This estimation is a wage decomposition with individual
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects following Abowd et al. (1999). This chapter is the ﬁrst to present the
AKM decomposition in the context of immigrant assimilation. I thus augment equation (1.1)
as follows13:
ln(HW )ijt = αFGi + γY SMit +Xijtβ + ηi + μj + ijt (1.2)
The estimation results are presented in table 1.5. Columns (1) to (3) reproduce the results
from table 1.2 controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns (4) and (5) add ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Column (4) controls only for a quartic in age, whereas column (5) controls also for occupation.
Comparing the estimates for the main coeﬃcient of interest, the wage catch-up rate γ, with
and without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, gives us an idea of the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity in immigrant
assimilation. Controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, in addition to region and industry, decreases the
estimated catch-up rate from 1 to 0.6 percentage points. In the estimations controlling also for
occupations, the rate decreases similarly from 0.9 to 0.6 percentage points. When analyzing the
importance of sorting across ﬁrms in the immigrant wage gap, Pendakur and Woodcock (2009)
show evidence that immigrants who have been in Canada for 10 years or more work in higher
ﬁxed eﬀect ﬁrms than more recent immigrants. However, they can not exclude that this result
may be due entirely to selection. The estimations with ﬁrm and individual ﬁxed eﬀects indicate
that moving to higher paying ﬁrms is indeed an important channel through which immigrant
wages catch up.
Table 1.6 shows the estimations for immigrants from the main origin groups. Comparing
the estimates with and without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, the wage catch-up decreases from 1.3 to 0.9
percentage points for Eastern Europeans, 1.1 to 0.8 percentage points for Brazilians and from 0.3
to -0.1 percentage points for immigrants from Africa. Changing ﬁrms accounts for approximately
one third of the wage catch-up for Eastern Europeans and Brazilians. For immigrants from
Africa, all of the observed catch-up occurs by changing ﬁrms.
12The main papers are Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2009).
13I estimate this wage regression with two high dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects using the algorithm presented in
Guimaraes and Portugal (2009) implemented in Stata through the command reg2hdfe.
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Immigrants Climb up the ‘Firm Quality Ladder’ with Time Spent in the Host
Country
Not much is known about ﬁrms that hire immigrants and how immigrants progress in the
ﬁrm ”quality ladder” with time spent in the host country. The previous section shows that
immigrants sort into low-wage ﬁrms and part of the assimilation process goes through switching
to better paying ﬁrms. In this section, I take a closer look at ﬁrms where immigrants work and
at immigrant careers in the ﬁrst years in the country from a ﬁrm perspective.
Figure 1.6 shows ﬁrm descriptives for ﬁrms where immigrants work over time. With years
spent in the host country, a higher proportion of immigrants gains access to long-term contracts.
Immigrants also become more integrated in the labour market: They start oﬀ their careers in
ﬁrms with a very large share of immigrant workers14, but are exposed to more native co-workers
as time goes by. They also move to larger ﬁrms.
Firm ﬁxed eﬀects measure the ﬁrm wage premium, i.e., how ﬁrms in narrowly deﬁned regions
and sectors reward individuals working in the same occupation diﬀerently. The ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
are often thought of as a measure of ﬁrm productivity. Another more direct measure of ﬁrm
productivity is the ﬁrm’s volume of sales per worker. The ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimated in the
previous section are net of the individual ﬁxed eﬀect. As a robustness check, I also estimate
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects using the same speciﬁcation than in equation 1.2 but without individual ﬁxed
eﬀects. All measures of productivity (volume of sales per worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimated
with or without individual ﬁxed eﬀects) show similar patterns: over time, immigrants move to
ﬁrms which are on average more productive.
The results for all immigrant groups are similar and are presented in the web appendix.
One worry about these descriptive statistics is that they pool together all cohorts and do not
deal with selective out-migration. For instance, if only immigrants who start oﬀ their careers in
more productive ﬁrms remain in the country, the results would be driven exclusively by selection
and would not tell us much about the assimilation process. To address this concern, I do the
same calculations for all cohorts separately distinguishing between all the immigrants from a
cohort and ”stayers”. The means are ﬁrst calculated each year for all immigrants belonging to
a certain cohort and then only for immigrants who can be tracked in the data each year. The
graphics for the 2003 cohort are presented in ﬁgure 1.7. The graphics for all other cohorts are
similar and are presented in the web appendix. There is no initial diﬀerence in the proportion
of immigrants who hold long-term contracts comparing immigrants who remain in the panel
all the years and all the immigrants in the cohort. However, as immigrants get long-term
contracts, they become more likely to remain in formal employment in Portugal, which explains
the divergent trends between the two groups. All the other graphics suggest a common analysis.
Immigrants who stay in formal employment each year are the ones who start oﬀ in larger, more
productive and more integrated ﬁrms. In terms of assimilation, the important aspect is that
although the means are higher in levels for ”stayers”, the trends are in most cases parallel.
14For papers that analyze immigrant segregation in the workplace using linked employer-employee data see
Andersson et al. (2010) and Dustmann et al. (2011).
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The detailed calculations allowing for cohort eﬀects and selection conﬁrm the overall inter-
pretation of the plots in ﬁgure 1.6. One of the channels of immigrant assimilation goes through
moving to larger, more integrated and more productive ﬁrms.
The descriptives presented above show that immigrants move up the wage distribution with
years spent in the host country labour market. A third of this upward mobility is linked to
moving to ﬁrms that are more productive and that pay higher wages. In the next section, I build
a model of immigrant economic assimilation based on ﬁrm heterogeneity and employer learning.
When immigrants enter the labour market, little is known about their true productivity. There
are complementarities between worker and ﬁrm type and ﬁrms value certainty over a worker’s
productivity. With high uncertainty about their types, immigrants begin their careers at the
bottom of the ﬁrm productivity distribution. Over time, worker productivity is revealed and,
on average, immigrants get better matches. I simulate the model and show in the subsequent
section that it can account for many qualitative features of the data.
1.4 A Learning Model with Firm and Worker Heterogeneity
1.4.1 The Workers and the Firms
Each worker has a productivity ηi. This productivity is composed of three additive terms:
ηi = qi + ai + si
The term q is observed for all workers as, for example, skills easily observed at a job interview.
The component a is unobserved for all workers and captures ”true” ability or IQ. Finally, the
term s is observed for natives but not for immigrants as, for example the quality of a worker’s
education. All three terms are independently drawn from normal distributions with means μa,
μq and μs and standard deviations σa, σq and σs. The independence of a with respect to q and
s is a strong assumption but common in the employer learning literature. The productivity
η hence follows a normal distribution with mean μη = μa + μq + μs and standard deviation
ση = (σ
2
a + σ
2
q + σ
2
s)
1
2 . In line with the employer learning literature15, I assume the diﬀerent
components of worker productivity to remain unchanged over time.
The productivity of ﬁrms in the economy is assumed to follow a log normal distribution with
mean μc and standard deviation σc.
16 The distribution of ﬁrms is taken as given in the model
and is ﬁxed over time. The productivity of each ﬁrm is known by all agents in the market and
is constant over time. Each ﬁrm hires only one worker and takes the wage schedule as given.
The worker i - ﬁrm j match at time t produces output:
yijt = cj [K − (exp (−(ηi + it)))]
15Farber and Gibbons (1996) or Lange (2007)
16For evidence on the skewness of the ﬁrm productivity distribution in the US, see Bartelsman and Doms
(2000)
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where K is a large positive constant and it ∼ N(0, σ) is a random error to production.17
For a given ﬁrm j, output is concave in the worker’s ability ηi. The shape of the production
function captures the idea that the quality of the machine (the ﬁrm productivity) limits the
productivity of the worker. This production function ensures that the ﬁrm’s expected output
depends negatively on the uncertainty on the worker’s productivity which will be a key element
in the allocation of workers to ﬁrms in the model.
1.4.2 The Learning Process
Each period, all employers observe a noisy measure of the worker’s productivity, ηi + it, and
update their beliefs. There is symmetric learning: the current employer does not have more
information about the worker’s productivity than other potential employers. What is learnt
about worker i at time t is also independent of the worker-ﬁrm match. Agents observe yijt and
make their update on
ξit ≡ − log
(
K − yijt
cj
)
= ηi + it
The noise is assumed to be independent of all other variables in the model and is the same for
immigrants and natives.
The normality assumptions make the learning process easily tractable. After a worker has
spent x years in the labour market, the posterior distribution of worker i’s type is a normal
distribution with mean μx,k,i and standard deviation σx,k, where k is an index for immigrant
fg or native nat. The expected productivity of an immigrant worker is:
μx,fg,i =
σ2
x(σ2a + σ
2
s) + σ
2

(qi + μa + μs) +
σ2a + σ
2
s
x(σ2a + σ
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s) + σ
2
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and its variance is:
σ2x,fg =
σ2 (σ
2
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2
s)
x(σ2a + σ
2
s) + σ
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
For a native worker:
μx,nat,i =
σ2
xσ2a + σ
2

(qi + μa + si) +
σ2a
xσ2a + σ
2

x−1∑
l=0
ξil
and
σ2x,nat =
σ2σ
2
a
xσ2a + σ
2

17Since η follows a normal distribution, there are workers who produce negative output. I choose mη and K
large enough such that this fraction of workers is negligible.
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The expected worker productivity is a weighted average of the initial prior and the observed
performance on the labour market. Initially, the weight on the prior is higher for natives as
the prior is more precise. Over time the worker’s expected productivity converges to the true
productivity. The variance of the posterior is higher for immigrant workers as there is more
uncertainty about them. Over time, the diﬀerence between the two groups decreases and in the
limit the variance of the posterior tends to zero for every worker.
After x years in the labour market, the cross-sectional distribution of expected productivity
for all immigrant workers of the same cohort is a Normal distribution with expected value
E (μx,fg|Ix) = μη
and variance18
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Similarly for natives, expected productivity for all native workers of the same cohort, μx,nat,
follows a Normal distribution with expected value
E(μx,nat|Ix) = μη
and variance
V (μx,nat|Ix) = σ2q + σ2s +
x2(σ2a)
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Over time, the distribution of expected productivity becomes wider for both groups, while
the mean always stays the same. Due to the initial information asymmetry between natives and
immigrants, the distribution of expected productivity is always wider for natives. Over time,
the two distributions converge.
1.4.3 The Assignment Mechanism
The expected production of a ﬁrm j that hires worker i conditioned on all information available
about the worker after x periods in the labour market is:19
E (yijt) = cj
[
K − exp
(
−μx,k,i + 1
2
(σ2x,k + σ
2
 )
)]
Firms prefer to hire workers with a higher risk-adjusted expected productivity μx,k,i − 1
2
σ2x,k.
Within a group and cohort, ﬁrms prefer workers with a higher expected productivity μx,k,i. The
term σx,k introduces a distortion across groups and cohorts: For a given expected productiv-
ity, ﬁrms prefer workers for whom expected productivity is more certain. This introduces an
18The calculation is in the appendix.
19This expression comes from the fact that exp(−(ηi + i,t)) follows a log normal distribution with mean
exp(−μx,k,i + 1
2
(σ2x,k + σ
2
 ))
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advantage for older cohorts and natives in the labour market.
For each cohort of natives or immigrants at each level of experience in the labour market,
μx,k − 1
2
σ2x,k follows a normal distribution with expected value
Mx,k = E
(
μx,k − 1
2
σ2x,k|Ix
)
= μη − 1
2
σ2x,k
and variance
Vx,k = V
(
μx,k − 1
2
σ2x,k|Ix
)
= V (μx,k)
The distribution of μx,k − 1
2
σ2x,k for all workers, immigrants and natives, of a given cohort
after x years in the market is hence a mixture of two normal distributions. The C.D.F. of this
distribution is:
F (t) = pΦ
⎛
⎝ t−Mx,fg
V
1
2
x,fg
⎞
⎠+ (1− p)Φ
⎛
⎝ t−Mx,nat
V
1
2
x,nat
⎞
⎠
where Φ is the C.D.F of the standard normal distribution and p is the proportion of immigrants
in the cohort.
Assuming that each worker remains in the labour market for T periods, that all cohorts
are similar and that the proportion of immigrants is constant across years, the C.D.F. of the
distribution of μx,k − 1
2
σ2x,k for all workers in the market in a given year is:
F (t) =
T∑
x=1
p
T
Φ
⎛
⎝ t−Mx,fg
V
1
2
x,fg
⎞
⎠+ 1− p
T
Φ
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An eﬃcient equilibrium at time t consists of an assignment of workers to ﬁrms and a wage
schedule that maximize expected aggregate output. In such an assignment, each period workers
are matched to ﬁrms according to the worker’s risk-adjusted expected productivity and the
ﬁrm’s productivity. Worker i is assigned to ﬁrm j with productivity c∗j
(
μx,k,i − 1
2
σ2x,k
)
, such
that
G
(
c∗j
(
μx,k,i − 1
2
σ2x,k
))
= F
(
μx,k,i − 1
2
σ2x,k
)
where G is the C.D.F. of ﬁrm productivity. This assignment means that workers and ﬁrms
are matched by their relative position in the probability distributions. In a discrete setup, this
would mean that the nth worker, in order of decreasing expected worker productivity, will be
employed by the nth ﬁrm, in order of decreasing ﬁrm productivity. This has to hold in an
eﬃcient equilibrium and follows from the ﬁrm-worker complementarity.
In this setup there is no need to solve a dynamic problem as every period the distributions
of ﬁrms and workers’ expected productivity are the same and there are no moving costs. Each
period there is a new equilibrium based on all available information. Facing a wage schedule
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w(z), where z is risk adjusted worker productivity, ﬁrm j maximizes expected proﬁts:
max
z
{
cj
[
K − exp
(
−z + 1
2
σ2
)]
− w(z)
}
The ﬁrst order condition implies that the expected marginal product must equal the marginal
increase of the wage.20 In equilibrium, this is only true for the proposed assignment, so I can
write:
w′(z) = b c∗(z) exp(−z)
where b = exp
(
1
2
σ2
)
is a constant. The wage schedule in the economy can be found by
integrating this expression:
w(x) = b
∫ x
A
c∗(z) exp(−z)dz
where A is the minimum worker productivity. Since there exists no closed-form solution for
the optimal ﬁrm match c∗(z), no explicit solution for the wage can be found. In the following
subsection, the model’s predictions on the moments of the wage distribution will thus be derived
by simulation.
The shape of the wage schedule is governed by decreasing returns to skill, captured by
exp(−z), and the match function c∗(z). Decreasing returns alone would make the wage schedule
concave. This is counteracted by the equilibrium assignment, according to which better workers
work at better ﬁrms. Depending on the rate at which the optimal match function increases,
the wage schedule can be locally convex or concave, but is in all cases increasing in worker
productivity. The graphics in ﬁgure 1.8 plot the optimal ﬁrm match c∗(z) and the wage w(z) as
a function of worker risk-adjusted productivity z = μx,k,i − 1
2
σ2x,k. For the parameters chosen,
the ﬁrm match function is strictly convex. In general, its exact shape depends on the parameters
of the underlying skill and productivity distributions of workers and ﬁrms. In particular, the
convexity of c∗(x) is related to the skewness of the ﬁrm productivity distribution. If the ﬁrm
productivity distribution is heavily right-skewed, then a marginal improvement in worker skill
is associated with an increasingly better ﬁrm match, thus making the optimal match function
convex.
1.5 Comparing the Predictions of the Model to the Data
In this section, I derive predictions from the model presented in the previous section on the
distribution of wages and on job mobility patterns. I ﬁrst show that the predictions on the
immigrant mean wage, mean ﬁrm productivity and job mobility over time are in line with the
stylized facts of section 3. I then take the additional prediction of the model on the variance of
wages to the data.
The model does not have a closed form solution for the optimal worker ﬁrm match as c∗ is
20The second order condition holds, since the cross-derivative of expected production is positive. See Sattinger
(1993).
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the inverse of the C.D.F. of a log normal distribution. I therefore simulate the model. There
are 600,000 workers who each spend 30 periods in the labour market and immigrants represent
10% of workers in each cohort.
1.5.1 The Predictions of the Model and the Stylized Facts
In the empirical analysis in section 3, I highlighted three main stylized facts about the immigrant
wage catch-up:
1. Immigrant wages catch up to the wages of natives of the same age group
2. In the ﬁrst years in the country, immigrants exhibit high job mobility rates which decrease
over time
3. Part of the immigrant wage catch-up is explained by immigrants moving to better paying
and more productive ﬁrms
In this ﬁrst section, I show how the model accounts for these stylized facts.
The Mean Firm Productivity and the Mean Wage over Time
In the model, the distribution of the risk-adjusted expected productivity for a cohort of immi-
grants moves to the right and becomes wider over time: the right-shift in the distribution is
due to less uncertainty about immigrant true productivity: σ2xk decreases. The widening of the
distribution comes from employer learning about each worker’s true productivity.
Mean FirmMatch: As ﬁrms reward certainty over the worker’s productivity, new entrants
on the market are matched to less productive ﬁrms on average. Among new entrants, immigrants
have a higher uncertainty than natives and hence occupy on average the bottom of the ﬁrm
productivity distribution. Over time, uncertainty decreases and workers gain access to better
ﬁrms. This eﬀect shifts the distribution of their ﬁrm matches to the right and hence increases
the mean ﬁrm productivity over time. This eﬀect is stronger for immigrants than for natives of
the same cohort as there is more to learn about immigrants.21
MeanWage: The reduced uncertainty about productivity also improves immigrants’ wages
through two main eﬀects. First, as described above, they gain access to better ﬁrms, thus
increasing their marginal product. Second, their expected marginal product increases due to
reduced uncertainty: exp(−μxki+ 1
2
σ2xk) declines. Job mobility thus accounts for only a part of
the total wage gains in the model.22
21If the match function c∗(x) is convex, as in the present simulation, there is another eﬀect on the mean ﬁrm
match: as true worker productivity is revealed, and the variance of the expected productivity distribution of a
cohort rises, the mean match increases. However, as explained earlier, the local convexity of c∗(x) depends on
the exact parameter values chosen. This eﬀect is second-order relative to the shift of the worker productivity
distribution.
22Again, the local curvature of the wage function together with the increasing variance of the expected pro-
ductivity distribution exerts a second order eﬀect on mean wages.
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The model also predicts an increase in the mean of the log ﬁrm match and the mean of the
log wage for an entering cohort of workers. The same mechanisms that increase the mean wage
and the mean ﬁrm match also lead to increases in the log of these variables.23
The graphics of ﬁgure 1.9 show the mean log ﬁrm productivity and the mean log wage for
an entry cohort of immigrants over time. The left hand side graphics compare an entry cohort
of immigrants to natives of the same cohort, and the right hand side graphics compare an entry
cohort of immigrants to the whole native labour force. The mean log wage of immigrants is
increasing and part of the increase is due to ﬁrm heterogeneity. Comparing immigrants and
natives of the same cohort, the mean log wage is initially higher for natives as they start their
careers in better ﬁrms. Over time, the mean log wage for both groups increases, more so for
immigrants as there is initially more uncertainty about their productivity.
The model thus generates predictions that are consistent with the ﬁrst and third stylized
fact of the data: On average, immigrants catch up to natives of the same age group, and part
of this catch up is accounted for by moving to better ﬁrms. To sensibly derive predictions on
job mobility, a variant of the model is discussed in the next subsection.
Job Mobility
The assignment model presented above has very strong continuity assumptions and a restrictive
one to one match. This way of modeling allows to solve explicitly for the optimal worker-ﬁrm
match and hence to simulate the patterns of the ﬁrm productivity distribution over time. In this
continuous version of the model, all workers move jobs every period as information is revealed.
In order to make the predictions on job mobility more realistic, I make a small change to the
model above and assume that there is a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, and that each has a ﬁxed number
of jobs. Firms are ordered by their productivity level: 0 < c1 < c2 < .. < cm. All the other
ingredients of the model remain the same.
As before, an equilibrium is deﬁned by an assignment of workers to ﬁrms and a wage
schedule. I can deﬁne m− 1 worker risk-adjusted expected productivity thresholds, lj , so that
workers with risk-adjusted expected productivity μx,k − 1
2
σ2x,k ∈ [lj , lj+1] are assigned to the
ﬁrm of productivity cj . The wages are derived in the same way as in the model above. I
assume that there are no moving costs. Workers switch ﬁrms when their risk-adjusted expected
productivity is revealed to be much higher or much lower than expected - that is, when their
expected productivity crosses a threshold lj .
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Comparing immigrant and native workers, the model yields a main prediction: Immigrant
workers switch ﬁrms more often than natives do, but the diﬀerence in job mobility between the
two groups decreases over time. There is initially more uncertainty about immigrant produc-
tivity and more updating for immigrants each period. The diﬀerence between the two groups
decreases over time as extra information each period represents a smaller and smaller part of
23Since the log wage function is concave the second order eﬀect of an increasing variance of expected produc-
tivity now depresses the mean log wage.
24The distribution of the changes in risk-adjusted expected productivity for a cohort over time is derived in
the appendix.
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all information available about the worker. This prediction is in line with the stylized fact on
immigrant job mobility from section 3. Immigrants move jobs more often than natives but at
a decreasing rate.25
1.5.2 Taking an Additional Prediction of the Model to the Data
The Variance of Wages over Time
The model considered is an employer learning model and as such generates clear predictions on
the second moment of the wage distribution. In this section, I show that the model predicts
an increase in the dispersion of wages for immigrants over time and that this increase arises
through switching ﬁrms.
Variance of Wages: As worker productivity is revealed, the distribution of expected
productivity for a cohort of workers widens over time. This eﬀect increases the variance of
wages since workers are paid according to their expected marginal product. In the present
model, this eﬀect is magniﬁed by worker assignment to heterogeneous ﬁrms. As the distribution
of expected productivity widens over time, so does the distribution of ﬁrm productivity workers
are matched to. If the c∗ schedule is convex, then the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity will
further increase due to a second eﬀect: As new entrants move up the ﬁrm-quality ladder, they
gain access to increasingly better ﬁrms. This is related to the underlying skewness of the
ﬁrm productivity distribution. The distribution of assigned ﬁrm productivity for these workers
widens and further contributes to the increase in the variance of wages. According to the model,
we should thus see an increasing proﬁle of the variance of log wages26 for a cohort over time and
this increase arises in the model through switching ﬁrms. If we consider a model with a ﬁnite
number of ﬁrms, not all of the increase in the variance of wages is related to switching ﬁrms:
the dispersion of immigrant wages increases even within the same ﬁrm as employers learn about
worker productivity.
In the next section, I conduct an empirical analysis of the variance of log wages for immigrant
and native workers entering the labour market between 2002 and 2009 in order to take this
prediction to the data.
The Variance of Wages in the Data
I start by estimating equation (1.3) below by ordinary least squares:
ln(HW )it = origini ∗ cohorti ∗ yeart + it (1.3)
The variable origin is a dummy for each origin group: native, Brazilians, Eastern Europeans,
25The model considered is silent on the eﬀect of tenure. A possible way to introduce the impact of tenure
is to add accumulation of employer speciﬁc human capital. This generates moving costs which depend on the
ﬁrm productivity. Solving for the extended model implies solving for a dynamic equilibrium instead of the stable
equilibrium in the previous section.
26The increase in the variance of wages will also raise the variance of log wages. In the present simulation, this
eﬀect dominates the eﬀect coming from the higher mean of wages, which depresses the variance of log wages.
25
Africans and other immigrants; cohort is a dummy variable for each entry cohort from 2002 until
2009; and year denotes a dummy for calendar year, from 2002 until 2009. This speciﬁcation is
a more general form of the speciﬁcation used in section 3. The aim is to estimate the dispersion
of the wages net of all mean eﬀects. The residual estimated from this regression represents the
part of the log wages which is not explained by the evolution of the mean log wages of workers
from a given group and cohort over time.
The graphics in ﬁgure 1.11 plot the variance over time of the residuals estimated for natives
and immigrants of the 2003 cohort under diﬀerent speciﬁcations. I focus on the 2003 cohort
as an example, the same analysis is conducted for all other cohorts in the web appendix. The
ﬁrst plot uses the speciﬁcation of equation (1.3), the following plots add controls ﬁrst for age
groups, region and industry; then occupations; and ﬁnally ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
The variance of log wages is higher for natives than for immigrants and it is increasing
over time for both groups. This stylized fact holds true independent of the exact speciﬁcation
considered. Controlling for region, industry and occupation explains part of the diﬀerence in
the level of the variance of log wages between natives and immigrants. Immigrants have more
undiﬀerentiated log wages because they sort into more similar industries and occupations than
natives. However, the increase in the variance proﬁles over time remains the same. Controlling
for ﬁrm heterogeneity has a diﬀerent eﬀect. The increasing variance proﬁle of immigrants
and natives is ﬂattened when ﬁrm heterogeneity is taken into account. I interpret this eﬀect as
evidence that new entrants on the market sort through changing ﬁrms. This eﬀect is particularly
strong in the ﬁrst years in the labour market.
Figure 1.12 presents the same results but restricting the sample to workers from the 2003
cohort who are in employment every year. The patterns are very similar to those in ﬁgure 1.11
which shows that selection out of the labour market does not have an eﬀect in these estimations.
The results are similar for all cohorts and origin groups. This is shown in the web appendix.
The stylized facts are in line with the predictions of the model on the variance of log wages.
The variance of log wages is higher for natives than for immigrants as initially more is known
about native productivity. Natives have a higher variance of expected productivity and gain
access to a wider range of ﬁrms. The variance of log wages is increasing over time for all new
entrants in the market. As productivity is revealed, workers are sorted and work at more diverse
ﬁrms. This mechanism is consistent with the stylized fact that ﬁrm heterogeneity explains part
of the increase in the variance of log wages.
1.6 Competing Theories of the Distribution of Wages
1.6.1 The Learning Model with Firm and Worker Heterogeneity
The model of the distribution of wages presented in section 4 is a model in which the type of
workers is unknown and as productivity is revealed workers are assigned to more productive
ﬁrms. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical analysis presented in
section 5. The mean wages and the variance of wages are increasing over time. Both of these
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eﬀects are partly explained by switching ﬁrms and the probability of switching ﬁrm decreases
over time.
To model the diﬀerence between natives and immigrants, I assumed that there is initially
more uncertainty about immigrant productivity than native productivity. Two stylized facts
are in line with this assumption: immigrants switch ﬁrms more often than natives; and the
variance of wages is higher for natives than for immigrants.
An additional prediction from the learning model is that the variance of the changes in
expected productivity of workers of the same cohort declines over time. With time spent in the
labour market there is progressively less to be learnt about the worker’s productivity. This is
the mechanism which leads to the decrease in job mobility over time. Initially, as there is more
uncertainty about immigrants, the variance of the changes in expected productivity is higher
for immigrants than for natives. The variance decreases for both groups over time but faster
for immigrants than for natives.27 In order to investigate this prediction, I ﬁrst estimate the
following equation with ordinary least squares:
Δ ln(HW )it = origini ∗ cohorti ∗ yeart + it (1.4)
This equation is similar to the one used to estimate the variance of log wages in the previous
section. I calculate the variance of the residual for immigrants and natives for each cohort, each
year. I consider in this calculation only ”stayers”, that is workers who remain in employment
every year. I then estimate the following regression by weighted least squares:
V ar(ˆlt) = αFGl + βEXPl + γFGl ∗ EXPl + yeart + lt (1.5)
l refers to a origin-cohort (for ex. natives belonging to the 2003 cohort), t refers to calendar
time. Table 1.7 presents the estimations. The variance of the wage growth is on average higher
for immigrants than for natives and decreases for both groups over time. I interpret the fact
that the variance of the wage growth is higher for immigrants than for natives as evidence of
the higher uncertainty over immigrant productivity.
In the next sections I consider two competing models of the wage distribution and investigate
whether they match the stylized facts on immigrant economic assimilation. Table 1.6.3 compares
the predictions of the three competing explanations to the stylized facts.
1.6.2 Search Model
A competing model of the distribution of wages which may be useful in the context of under-
standing the immigrant wage catch up is a search model. This class of models departs from the
perfect competition framework and introduces search frictions. Workers need time to receive
wage oﬀers, and as they do, they climb up the wage distribution. I assume the diﬀerence be-
tween immigrants and natives to be that immigrants have less ”search capital” upon arrival in
27The distribution of the changes in risk-adjusted expected productivity for a cohort over time is derived in
the appendix.
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the country and over time they receive wage oﬀers at an increasing frequency.
In order to be more speciﬁc, let us consider a simple search model: The distribution of wages
is exogenous, workers get wage oﬀers from a wage distribution with C.D.F F . Oﬀers arrive at
a rate λ(x). If the new wage oﬀer is higher than the current wage the worker switches jobs, if
not he remains with the same employer. This model is a simple on the job search model as for
instance Burdett (1978). I abstract in this simple model from unemployment. Workers remain
in employment all periods. When taking the predictions of the model to the data I consider only
”stayers”, that is, workers of an entry cohort who are always in employment. The diﬀerence
between immigrant and native workers in the model is then modeled by a diﬀerent arrival rate
of wage oﬀers. Immigrants are assumed to have initially lower search capital, λfg(0) < λnat(0),
but the rate of arrival increases faster for immigrants than for natives λ′fg(x) > λ
′
nat(x).
According to this simple model, the mean wages of workers of a cohort increases and the
increase is due to switching ﬁrms. All workers move up the wage distribution as they receive
more wage oﬀers over time. Workers also switch ﬁrms at a decreasing rate with time spent in
the labour market. As workers move to better ﬁrms, the probability of receiving a better oﬀer
decreases over time. These two predictions are in line with the patterns in the data for new
entrants. However, another prediction of the search model is that the distribution of wages of a
cohort over time becomes truncated to the left. Workers who started oﬀ in the worse jobs move
up over time, faster than the workers who started with a higher relative wage. This mechanism
implies that the variance of wages of a cohort decreases over time.28
Figure 1.13 shows a simulation of the mean and variance of the log wages and wage growth of
the model above for an entry cohort in the labour market. In this simulation, the probability of
receiving a wage oﬀer each period is constant and set equal to 0.1. The mean wage is increasing
and the variance of wages is decreasing with time spent on the market. The exact shape of
the curves depends on the assumption on the arrival rate λ(x) but these two results hold for
all cases. A decreasing variance of wages is in contradiction with the patterns in the data for
new entrants in the market, immigrants and natives. Independently of the precise assumption
on the diﬀerence between immigrants and natives entering the labour market, a simple search
model is not compatible with the increase in the variance of wages for ”stayers” over time, as
documented in section 5.
1.6.3 Human Capital Model
Another competing model is based on human capital accumulation.
Let us consider the following setup: There are complementarities between worker skill and
ﬁrm productivity, as in the model above. Over time, workers accumulate human capital and
become more productive. A possible assumption to model the diﬀerence between natives and
immigrants is that immigrants have an initial lower level of human capital but that they accu-
28This prediction on the monotonicity of the variance of wages only holds when considering only workers who
remain in employment every year. The model is the same than the one in Manning (2000), however he ﬁnds that
the patterns of the variance of wages are non-monotonic: this is due to the eﬀect of workers who accept a job
oﬀer after an unemployment spell.
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mulate human capital in the ﬁrst years in the host country faster than natives. Let us assume
also that the human capital function is concave: there are decreasing returns to investment in
human capital.
New entrants in the market start oﬀ at the bottom of the ﬁrm distribution since they have
the lowest levels of human capital. Over time, as their human capital stock increases, they gain
access to better ﬁrms and the mean wages increase. As the productivity of workers increases at
a decreasing rate, the job mobility rate decreases over time. The prediction on the immigrant
wage catch up and on job mobility are the same than those in the model of section 4.
To derive predictions on the variance of wages, an extra assumption is needed which is that
workers accumulate human capital heterogeneously. This implies that as workers accumulate
human capital, the wages of a cohort become more dispersed. The variance of the wage growth
also decreases over time as there are decreasing returns to human capital accumulation.
As this speciﬁc example illustrates, a human capital model can explain any set of stylized
facts, if the appropriate assumptions are made. It is therefore not really testable. Distinguishing
between heterogeneous accumulation of human capital and learning is an unsolved problem in
the literature, and goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
Competing Theories of the Distribution of Wages
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Learning Model Search Model Human Capital Model
Basic Set up Employer learning with
complementarities be-
tween worker and ﬁrm
type
On-the-job-search Human capital accumula-
tion with complementari-
ties between worker and
ﬁrm type
Immigrants and Natives Higher initial uncertainty
about immigrant produc-
tivity
Lower initial search capi-
tal for immigrants
Lower initial human capi-
tal for immigrants
Immigrants and Natives
over Time
Immigrants accumulate
search capital faster than
natives
Immigrants accumulate
human capital faster than
natives
Other Features Firms value certainty over
the worker’s productivity
Decreasing returns to hu-
man capital accumulation
Stylized Facts
Immigrant wage catch up
  
High but decreasing job
mobility for immigrants   
Switching ﬁrms accounts
for part of the catch up   
Variance of wages in-
creases over time  X if heterogeneous accumulation
of human capital
Variance of the wage
growth decreases over
time
 X if heterogeneous accumulation
of human capital
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1.7 Conclusion
Although there is widespread evidence that immigrant wages catch-up to the wages of compara-
ble natives with years spent in the host country, the mechanisms through which wages catch-up
are not well understood. I use a unique linked employer employee panel for Portugal to study
the careers of immigrants in the ﬁrst years in the host country. The data allows following all
workers in the private sector in the country and provides detailed information on the ﬁrms.
I show that immigrant wages catch up to the natives of the same age at a rate of 10
percentage points in 10 years. Immigrants exhibit very high job mobility rates and one third of
the wage catch-up is associated to moving to better paying ﬁrms. Sorting across occupations
explains a large part of the immigrant-native wage gap but changing occupations does not
contribute to the catch-up. Over time, immigrants move to bigger, better paying and more
productive ﬁrms. They tend to start their careers in segregated ﬁrms but the share of native
co-workers increases as time goes by. The proportion of immigrants with a long term contract
also increases with years spent in the labour market.
Motivated by these new stylized facts, I suggest a model of immigrant economic assimilation
which highlights the role of uncertainty about immigrant productivity. Workers and ﬁrms are
heterogeneous and ﬁrms value certainty over worker productivity. The model predicts that
immigrants start their careers in the host country working in low productivity ﬁrms. Over time,
they get access to more productive ﬁrms and move up the wage distribution. I derive additional
predictions from the model on the variance of wages. In line with the model, immigrant wages
become more dispersed with time spent in the host country and the increase in dispersion is
associated with ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Finally, I consider two competing explanations of the immigrant wage catch-up: search
and human capital accumulation. The predictions on the evolution of the variance of wages
of immigrants from a simple search model are not in line with the patterns in the data. A
human capital accumulation model with heterogeneous agents may be consistent with the data.
Distinguishing between the predictions from a learning model and from a human capital model
with heterogeneous agents is an unsolved problem in the literature, which is beyond the scope
of this chapter.
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Figure 1.1: Mean Hourly Wages for Immigrants by Cohort
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Figure 1.2: Number of Immigrant Workers in the Data
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Figure 1.3: Region of Origin of Immigrants by Cohort
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Figure 1.4: Representation of Immigrant Wages in the Distribution of Native Wages by Year
since Migration
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Note: The graphic illustrates the representation of immigrant wages after 1, 5 and 9 years in
the country in the native wage distribution. With years spent in the country, the distribution
of wages of immigrants comes closer to the one of the natives.
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Figure 1.5: Representation of Immigrant Wages in the Distribution of Native Wages by Years
since Migration, 2003 Cohort
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Note: The top graphic is for all immigrants of the 2003 cohort and the bottom one is for
immigrants of the 2003 cohort who remain in the data every year the ”stayers”. The comparison
group is natives who are in the data in 2003 and natives who are in the data in 2009.
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Figure 1.6: Climbing up the ’Firm Quality Ladder’
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Figure 1.7: Climbing up the ’Firm Quality Ladder’, 2003 Cohort
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Figure 1.8: An Employer Learning Model with Firm and Worker Heterogeneity
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Note: The plots of the expressions derived in the model are drawn setting all means equal to 0,
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Figure 1.9: Predictions on the Mean Log Firm Productivity and the Mean Log Wages
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the natives of the same cohort. The ﬁgures on the right compare immigrants of an entering
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Figure 1.10: Predictions on the Variance of Log Firm Productivity and the Variance of Log
Wages
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Figure 1.11: The Variance of Log Wages
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Notes: The plots represent the variance of the residual by year and cohort for all natives and
immigrants of the 2003 cohort estimated by least squares from the following speciﬁcation:
ln(HW )ijt = origini ∗ cohorti ∗ yeart + it, and controlling progressively by age group and
industry (top right), occupation (bottom left) and ﬁrm heterogeneity (bottom right).
The variance of log wages is higher for immigrants than for natives and increasing for both
groups over time. Firm heterogeneity explains the increase in the variance in particular in the
ﬁrst years in the labour market.
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Figure 1.12: The Variance of Log Wages, Stayers
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Notes: The plots are the same than those in ﬁgure 1.11 but consider only workers from the
2003 cohort who remain employment each year. The patterns are very similar, which show that
selection out of the labour market does not aﬀect the results.
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Figure 1.13: Predictions on the Mean and Variance of Wages of a Search Model
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Notes: The plots represent the patterns of the mean and variance of log wages and wage growth
for an entry cohort. Workers are assumed to stay in employment every period. The probability
to receive a wage oﬀer in any given period is set to 0.1.
The decrease in the variance of wages of a cohort over time is not compatible with the stylized
facts in section 5.
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Table 1.1: Population Selected Means
Natives All Immigrants East. Europ. Brazil Africa
Age 38.7 35.1 36.6 32.6 35.3
YSM 0 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.2
By Origin
East.Eur. 0 0.49 1 0 0
Brazil 0 0.22 0 1 0
Africa 0 0.20 0 0 1
By Region
Alentejo 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02
Algarve 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.08
Centro 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.07
Lisboa 0.29 0.49 0.32 0.55 0.77
Norte 0.40 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.06
By Industry
Manufacturing 0.31 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.06
Construction 0.18 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.56
Wholesale and retail trade 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.07
Hotels and restaurants 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.06
Transport, storage 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02
and communication
Real estate, renting 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.19
and business activities
Number of Workers 117,964 47,279 34,913 23,810
Number of Observations 8,506,801 339,986 152,008 89,001 65,977
Notes: This table shows the mean age for natives and immigrants of the three main origin groups and the ”years since
migration” (YSM) for immigrants; the distribution of immigrants by origin; and the distribution of immigrants and
natives by region and industry. Only recent immigrants who have entered the labour market after 2001 are considered
in the analysis. All the diﬀerences in means between groups are very signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 1.2: Immigrant Wage Catch up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FG -0.353 -0.254 -0.152
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011)
YSM 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
N 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209
R2 0.105 0.456 0.608 0.313 0.324 0.332
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
‘FG’ is a dummy for foreigners. ‘YSM’ is the interaction between ‘FG’ and years since migration. ’Region’ is
a set of 27 dummy variables (nutse3) accounting for the region of the country the establishment is located in;
’Industry’ is a set of 211 dummy variables accounting for the industry of the establishment at the 3 digit level
(cae rev2.1); ’Occupation’ is a set of 110 dummy variables accounting for the occupation of the individual at the
3 digit level (cnp94).
FG measures the wage gap and YSM the wage catch up. Sorting into regions, sectors and occupations explains
half of the wage gap between natives and immigrants. Immigrants wages grow at a rate of approximately
1 percentage point faster than natives. The catch up is not correlated to immigrants moving industries or
occupations. Estimations with and without individual heterogeneity are similar and show that the result is not
driven by selection.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 1.3: Immigrant Wage Catch up by Origin Group
East.Eur. Brazil Africa East.Eur. Brazil Africa
(1) (1) (1) (4) (4) (4)
FG -0.377 -0.314 -0.346
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0024)
YSM 0.010 0.020 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.003
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
N 7,395,761 7,334,379 7,319,209 7,395,761 7,334,379 7,319,209
R2 0.100 0.148 0.096 0.315 0.315 0.315
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 1.2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
The wage gap upon entry is highest for immigrants from Eastern Europe and lowest for Brazilians. The wage catch
up rate accounting for individual ﬁxed eﬀects is above 1 percentage point for Brazilians and Eastern Europeans
but immigrants from Africa lag substantially behind.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 1.4: Job Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FG 0.211 0.191 0.117 0.083 0.080
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
YSM -0.021 -0.017 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age -0.036 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Quartic in Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure -0.023 -0.019 -0.019
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cubic in Tenure Yes Yes Yes
Hourly wage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005)
Region Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Occupation Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cst 0.071 0.582 0.400 0.368 0.389
N 5,731,442 5,731,442 5,731,442 5,731,442 5,731,442
R2 0.010 0.011 0.049 0.081 0.082
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the worker will be working in a diﬀerent ﬁrm next period, 0 if
he stays with the same employer. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 1.2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
The probability of changing employers is higher for immigrants than for natives. This probability
declines with years spent in the labour market.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 1.5: Immigrant Wage Catch-up and Firm Fixed Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
YSM 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
N 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209
R2 0.313 0.324 0.332 0.945 0.945
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 1.2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
These regressions control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in the wage catch-up estimations. Comparing the
estimates for γ in this table and table 1.2 shows that the coeﬃcient decreases from 1ppt to 0.6ppt,
or from 0.9 to 0.6ppt when controlling also for occupations. Changing ﬁrms accounts for a third
of the immigrant wage catch-up.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 1.7: The Variance of the
Wage Growth
FG 0.0072 0.0056
(0.0009) (0.0022)
EXP -0.0025 -0.0026
(0.0009) (0.0002)
YSM 0.0004
(0.0005)
Year FE Yes Yes
N 56 56
R2 0.808 0.807
Notes: The dependent variable is the
variance of the residual estimated from
equation (1.4) for a origin-cohort at
each calendar year. ‘FG’ is a dummy
for foreigners.‘EXP’ are the years
of experience in the labour market
and ‘YSM’ is the interaction between
‘FG’ and ‘FG’. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
In line with the model, the variance
of the wage growth is higher for
immigrants than for natives and both
decrease over time.
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1.A Data Appendix
The data used in the paper is a linked employer-employee panel. The information is collected
yearly by the Ministry of Labour in Portugal and the questionnaire is compulsory for all ﬁrms
that employ at least one wage earner. All ﬁrms, establishments and workers have a unique
identifer. An observation is a worker-ﬁrm match in a given year.
1.A.1 Building the Panel
Pooling all observations from 2000 until 2009, the initial data has 27m observations. In this
section, I present details on the checks which were made to construct the panel adequately.
Workers are identiﬁed by their social security number. I start by identifying workers with an
invalid social security number. In most cases, an invalid social security number is coded with a
0. It may be that immigrants as they ﬁrst appear in the data have not been attributed a social
security number. Deleting these observations would lead to ignoring information related to the
ﬁrst year in the panel and underestimating the number of years spent in formal employment.
In order to recover the potential ﬁrst year in the panel of immigrant observations, I match
observations with a 0 social security number with observations in the following year by gender,
date of birth, nationality (Portuguese or not), and ﬁrm identiﬁer. The proﬁle of an individual
with an invalid social security number may hence only be recovered if he works in the same ﬁrm
the following year. This correction allows to recover 240,595 observations. 478,347 observations
still have an invalid social security number after this correction and are hence deleted.
I exclude workers who have several jobs at some point in their careers. The paper focuses
on the career of immigrants and in particular on the importance of job mobility. The cases
where workers have multiple jobs would need special attention. I discard these proﬁles: 2.8m
observations in total, 18% of immigrant and 10% of native observations.
I then check for basic inconsistencies in the workers’ proﬁles. Individuals for whom there
are changes in gender or in immigrant status over time are allocated the gender and immigrant
status reported more than half the times. 50,208 and 90,695 observations are dropped when
after this correction no conclusion is reached. Individuals with a decreasing age proﬁle are
also identiﬁed and dropped from the analysis: 305,661 observations, 1.3% of native and 1.4%
of immigrant observations. A last proﬁle consistency check concerns wages. Individuals with
an inconsistent wage growth proﬁle (log hourly wage growth smaller than −0.5 or bigger than
2) are deleted29. In total, 1,073,426 observations were deleted: 4.6% of native and 5.9% of
immigrant observations.
1.A.2 Sample Selection
For the analysis, I use only a sub-sample of individuals from the full panel. I restrict the analysis
to men, as the careers of women would need a separate analysis. 44% of native observations are
29This correction follows Cardoso (2005)
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from female workers but only 35% of immigrants.30 This leads to discarding 8.4m observations.
Only individuals working in the mainland of Portugal are considered. Workers who work in
the islands (Madeira, Aores) at some point of their career are excluded: 3% of immigrant and
4.7% of native observations. The data has a low coverage of agriculture, the whole industry
is hence excluded. 5% of immigrant observations and 2.5% of native observations are deleted.
Family workers and self-employed workers were dropped from the sample, only wage earners
were considered to make wage progression comparisons meaningful. This accounts to excluding
13% of native but only 4% of immigrant observations. Part-time workers are also excluded,
which accounts to 3.8% of native and 3.3% of immigrant observations.
1.A.3 Immigrant Cohorts and Origin Groups
Origin Groups
I exclude immigrants from the EU15 from the analysis. These immigrants beneﬁt from the same
conditions in the labour market than native workers and have very diﬀerent characteristics than
the other immigrant groups. The three main immigrant origins are Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe, the former Portuguese African colonies (African Countries of Portuguese Oﬃcial Lan-
guage), and Brazil. The residual group represents less than 10% of the total number of im-
migrant observations in the data. The countries considered in the Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe group are Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Romania, Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and the former Yugoslavia. The countries be-
longing to the PALOP are Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau and So Tom and
Prncipe. Similarly to the consistency checks above, workers who exhibit changes in origin are
identiﬁed and attributed the origin declared over half the times. Workers for which no conclusion
may be drawn have the origin variable set to missing.
Cohorts
The paper focuses on immigrants from the new immigration wave to Portugal. I consider only
immigrants ﬁrst tracked in the data after 2001. All immigrants already in the data in 2000
are dropped from the sample.31 This amounts to dropping approximately 7% of all immigrant
workers in the data between 2000 and 2009.
The information on the date of arrival in the country is not available. The ﬁrst time an
immigrant is observed in the panel is used as a proxy. This captures the ﬁrst time the worker
is in formal employment, since the data set covers all wage earners in the private sector in
Portugal. The cohort is deﬁned as the ﬁrst year the immigrant appears in the data and the
years since migration are calculated as the diﬀerence between the calendar year and the cohort
year. Moreover, a correction using the tenure variable is made to this calculation. Immigrants
3071% of the observations for Eastern European immigrants are from male workers.
31I use the whole panel from 1987 to check whether immigrants who are classiﬁed as new immigrants are in
the data at an earlier point in time. I ﬁnd that less than 10% of the immigrant observations considered in the
analysis can be tracked before 2000. The correction using only the year 2000 is thus an acceptable correction.
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in their ﬁrst year in the panel are assumed to have arrived in the country at their arrival in the
ﬁrm. Consider for example an immigrant who is ﬁrst observed in the data in 2003, but whose
tenure indicates that he has already worked in the same ﬁrm for two years. He is considered to
have been in the country since 2001.
Tenure for the purposes of the analysis refers to the time spent working in the same ﬁrm.
If an individual’s tenure is reported decreasing in the same ﬁrm (this may, for instance, be due
to a change in contract) then the number of years considered as tenure is the time since the
beginning of the ﬁrst contract with the ﬁrm. After this correction, if there are still diﬀerent dates
of entry in the ﬁrm across the years, the correct value is considered to be the one taken over
half of the times. When no conclusion may be reached after these corrections, the individual’s
tenure is set to missing.
1.A.4 Speciﬁc Data Issues and Robustness Checks
Dealing with the Missing Year of 2001
The data for the year of 2001 is not available. The analysis in the paper starts the analysis in
2002. I use the year 2000 to identify immigrants who are already in the country in 2000.
The missing data for 2001 poses several challenges and particularly in deﬁning the immigrant
cohorts. Workers who ﬁrst start working in 2001 but change employers between 2001 and 2002
are allocated to the 2002 cohort; whereas workers who remain with the same employer are
allocated to the 2001 cohort. A fraction of the 2002 cohort is made up of workers who have an
extra year of experience in the Portuguese market. If movers are positively selected, these extra
workers are also the ”best” workers of the 2001 cohort. Figure 1.1 in section 2 shows that the
pattern of the mean wages for the immigrants of the 2002 cohort does not appear to be very
diﬀerent from the one of the other cohorts.
I perform another robustness check: I redeﬁne cohorts as two-year instead of one-year
cohorts. I classify immigrants who ﬁrst appear in the data in 200132 or 2002 as belonging to the
ﬁrst cohort; immigrants who are ﬁrst tracked in 2003 or 2004 belong to the second cohort, etc.
The years since migration variable is re-calculated accordingly. Figure 1.14 plots the mean wages
for these newly deﬁned cohorts over time. I re-estimate all the main empirical speciﬁcations in
section 3 using this two-year cohorts and ﬁnd little diﬀerence in the main results.
32The correction using the tenure variable allows to allocate immigrants to the 2001 cohort even if the data
for 2001 is missing.
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Figure 1.14: Mean Hourly Wages for Immigrants by Two-year Cohort
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Dealing with the Changes in the Industry Classiﬁcation in 2007
In 2007, the classiﬁcation used for the industries in Portugal changed.33 I use the ’old’ classiﬁ-
cation in all the analysis. I do not use the oﬃcial table created by the Portuguese Institute of
Statistics to convert the new classiﬁcation into the old one. This would lead to over-estimate
the frequency with which workers change industries as the classiﬁcations are very diﬀerent. In
fact, when I consider ﬁrms which existed in 2006 and 2007 and which are all classiﬁed in a given
’new’ industry in 2007, there is a very large dispersion in the industries the ﬁrms belonged to in
2006. For all ﬁrms which can be tracked in the data before 2007, I assign the industry observed
before 2007 in the ’old’ classiﬁcation to the observations from 2007 until 2009. I then drop all
observations belonging to ﬁrms who enter the market in 2007 and later.
One may worry that excluding these observations may lead to a selection bias. I perform
two robustness checks to address this concern. First, I re-do all the main estimations in the
main empirical section which do not use the industry dummies including the ﬁrms entering
the market after 2007; second, I re-do the analysis excluding the years after 2007. I ﬁnd little
diﬀerence in the main results.
1.B Model Appendix
1.B.1 The Variance of the Expected Productivity for a Cohort
I calculate the variance of the distribution of the expected worker productivity (μx,k) for a given
cohort after x years in the labour market.
For immigrants:
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33The classiﬁcation until 2006 is cae rev 2.1 and from 2007 it is cae rev 3.
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1.B.2 The Distribution of the Changes in Risk-adjusted Expected Produc-
tivity for a Cohort
The change in worker risk-adjusted expected productivity from year x− 1 to year x
Δx,k =
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follows a normal distribution. I calculate the mean and variance of its distribution for
immigrants and natives of a given cohort.
The mean of Δx,k is the mean of −1
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σ2x−1,k as the mean of expected productivity
over a cohort of workers is constant over time.
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The variance of Δx,k is the variance of μx,k − μx−1,k as σ2x,k is constant across workers of
the same cohort in all periods in the market.
For immigrants:
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Noting that a, s and  are independent random variables, collecting terms in a, s and , and
calculating the variance:
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Chapter 2
The Labour Market Integration of
Immigrants and their Children
2.1 Introduction
As the children of the post-war guest workers arrive on the labour markets across Western
Europe, their integration becomes a major policy concern for the OECD countries. The in-
tegration of the children of immigrants, or second generation1, has little in common with the
immigrants’ integration process. These are children born and raised in the host country. Most
of the issues raised when dealing with the integration of immigrants such as the learning of the
host country language, the relative quality of schooling in the home country or the lack of an
extended social network are at odds in the context of the second generation. However, there is
increasing evidence that in Europe the children of immigrants lag behind the children of natives
in educational achievement and in labour market outcomes2. The focus of this chapter is to
understand the source of some of these diﬀerences at the European level.
One of the ﬁrst diﬃculties that arise when comparing the outcomes of children of immigrants
and children of natives3 is that immigrant parents often have a lower educational background
than the average native parents. It is a well known fact that the outcomes of children are
strongly inﬂuenced by parental background, as measured by parents’ education, occupation or
income. It is therefore important to compare children of natives and immigrants with similar
family characteristics to understand to which extent the gap in outcomes may be linked to
background. If immigrants have on average a lower background than natives, an immigrant child
may not be expected to do as well as the average child of native-born parents. A few papers have
addressed the impact of parental background on the second generation performance in individual
European countries, such as Riphahn (2003) for Germany, or Van Ours and Veenman (2003)
for the Netherlands. Rigorous cross-country comparisons, based on these papers, are diﬃcult
1The second generation is deﬁned in this context as the children born in the host country who have at least
one foreign-born parent.
2See Heath et al. (2008) for a recent literature review.
3The term ”natives” refers to individuals born in the host country. The TIES network uses the term ”com-
parison group” instead.
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to make since the methodology used and the outcomes measured are hardly comparable.
The ﬁrst contribution of the chapter is to address the impact of background diﬀerences
between immigrant and native families at the European level. I take advantage of a recent
survey of children of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and ex-Yugoslavia, in 15 European
cities, The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) project, which has very
detailed information on individual and family history. In particular, I focus on the impact
of parental background on the educational, labour market and marriage market outcomes of
the three second generation groups. All the analysis is done relatively to a comparison group
of children of natives living in the same cities. Educational achievement and earnings are
commonly used measures of economic assimilation. Second generation inter-ethnic marriage
has been shown to be highly correlated to labour market outcomes in the US, as in Card et al.
(2000), and is often looked upon as the ultimate measure of social assimilation. Marrying a
native has also been shown by Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009) to have a positive impact
on labour market outcomes of the US second generation. The aim here is to take advantage of
the detailed family information to determine which parental characteristics are correlated with
a higher probability of the child marrying a native. I show that parental background accounts
for a big part of the gap in educational and labour market outcomes between children of natives
and children of immigrants. Parental characteristics are also shown to be important predictors
of the extent to which second generation children marry within the ethnic group.
The long term consequences of immigration for the host country depend greatly on the
intergenerational mobility of immigrants. Immigrants outcomes get closer to the natives’ average
during their life cycle but have been shown not to converge, see for example in the US case
Lubotsky (2007). A more important question is whether the outcomes of their children and
grandchildren can be expected to converge to those of the oﬀspring of natives. It is a well
established fact that the outcomes of parents and children are correlated but that there is
regression towards the mean between generations. For instance, children of parents in the lower
tail of the income distribution will have on average a lower income than the mean but will
be closer to the mean than the parents were. In terms of intergenerational assimilation, it is
important to know to which extent there is regression towards the mean in immigrant families.
It is a priori not clear whether the transmission should be higher or lower for immigrants than
for natives. On the one hand, immigrants suﬀer disadvantages that their children do not, as
in most cases they completed their education in the home country and are not ﬂuent in the
host country language. This could lead to a higher mobility for children of immigrants than
children of natives. On the other hand, cultural factors have been shown to have an impact on
labour market outcomes and could slow the convergence of immigrant descendants’ outcomes to
the natives’. Fernandez and Fogli (2009), for instance, show for the US that second generation
fertility and female labour market participation are closely correlated to those of the country of
origin of the immigrant parents, making the convergence towards the native mean slower.
The second contribution of this chapter is to quantify the average intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital for immigrant and native families at the European level using diﬀerent
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measures of educational achievement and occupational status. Some recent papers have looked
at this issue for diﬀerent European countries, such as Bauer and Riphan (2007) for Switzerland,
Gang and Zimmermann (2000) for Germany, or Hammarstedt and Palme (2006) for Sweden.
The approach here is diﬀerent so that the analysis is made at the European level for three
second generation groups, the children of Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslav immigrants. I show
that the intergenerational transmission of educational outcomes and occupational status is on
average lower for immigrant than native families.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a short introduction
to the Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslav migration to Europe and describes the data used for
the analysis; Section 3 studies the outcomes of the second generation in the educational, labour
and marriage markets; Section 4 quantiﬁes the intergenerational transmission of human capital
in immigrant families; Section 5 concludes and points the direction to further research.
2.2 Context and Data
The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES)4 is a comparative research project
on the outcomes of the children of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and ex-Yugoslavia in major
European cities. The project is based on an international survey that has been administered to
approximately 10,000 individuals aged 18 to 35 years old in 15 cities in 8 countries (Vienna and
Linz in Austria, Brussels and Antwerp in Belgium, Paris and Strasbourg in France, Berlin and
Frankfurt in Germany, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in The Netherlands, Madrid and Barcelona
in Spain, Zrich and Basel in Switzerland and Stockholm in Sweden). The main focus of the
project is on the oﬀspring of Turkish immigrants: children of Turkish immigrants have partici-
pated in the survey in all countries except Spain; whereas children of immigrants from Morocco
have been selected in Belgium, The Netherlands and Spain; and children of immigrants from
ex-Yugoslavia have been surveyed in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
The main Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslav migration ﬂows to Western Europe started in
the post-war period and were driven by the area’s unprecedented growth. At the beginning
of the 1960s, Western Germany, soon followed by other European countries, signed the ﬁrst
guest-workers agreements. Immigrants, mainly from Turkey, would come to Western Europe
for a short period to help Western economies deal with labour shortages and would return to the
home countries with new skills to enhance the countries’ industrialization processes. Turkey
signed agreements with Austria, Belgium, The Netherlands, France, and Sweden. Morocco
4The TIES survey was carried out by survey bureaus under supervision of the nine national TIES partner in-
stitutes: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
(IMES), University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands; the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research
(ISPO), University of Leuven in Belgium; the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) in France; the
Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM), University of Neuchtel in Switzerland; the Centre
for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO), University of Stockholm in Sweden; the
Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabrck in Germany, the Insti-
tute for the Study of Migration (IEM), Pontiﬁcal Comillas University of Madrid in Spain, and the Institute for
European Integration Research (EIF), Austrian Academy of Sciences in Austria. For more information on the
TIES project, see http://www.tiesproject.eu/index.php/lang=en.
61
signed similar agreements in the 1960s with West Germany, France, Belgium and The Nether-
lands. Yugoslavia also participated in the late 1960s in guest worker programs with Austria and
Germany. Although these waves of migration were supposed to be temporary and host countries
tried to put a stop to immigration during the mid 1970s downturn, most guest workers settled
in Western Europe. During the 1980s and 1990s, European host countries saw their stocks of
Turkish, Moroccan and Yugoslav immigrants increase sharply through family reuniﬁcations. In
the early 2000s, Moroccan descendants amount to approximately 300,000 in The Netherlands
and 200,000 in Belgium. Turkish descendants in Western Europe are estimated at more than
3 million. The oﬀspring of immigrants from the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia
account for approximately 1 million people in Germany and close to 400,000 in Switzerland.
The timing of the TIES survey coincides with the arrival of the children of immigrants in the
European labour markets.
Several aspects make the TIES project a unique and extremely valuable instrument for the
study of the second generation in Europe. Firstly, the data is extremely detailed and contains
information on virtually all aspects of economic, social and political integration (education,
labour markets, income, parental background, housing and neighbourhood, social relations and
political participation, etc.). The fact that the questionnaire was the same in the diﬀerent
countries makes European comparisons possible. Secondly, and perhaps, more importantly, a
comparison group, consisting of children of parents born in the host countries, was also taken
into account, making the comparison between children of natives and children of immigrants
possible at the city level. The project should allow not only to compare, for instance, children
of Turkish immigrants in Switzerland and in Germany but also relative diﬀerences between the
outcomes of children of Turkish nationals and children of natives in the diﬀerent cities.
For the analysis, I use data on all countries, except Spain and Belgium5, and all origin
groups. Only individuals out of full-time education are considered in the analysis in order to
make the analysis on educational achievement and labour market performance meaningful. As
the population of the survey is relatively young, this means that only two thirds of the total
sample is considered in the estimations. Table 2.1 presents the number of individuals considered
in the sample by city and origin group. The deﬁnition of second generation used throughout the
paper is children with a least one foreign-born parent. Most second generation individuals in
the sample considered have both parents foreign-born, only approximately 6% have one foreign-
born and one native parent. This distinction does not make much diﬀerence in the outcomes
analyzed and is hence not presented in most of the results. The only exception is the marriage
market outcomes.
A major drawback of the data set is the fact that the weighting scheme of the diﬀerent
countries is hardly comparable. For the moment, all the estimations are made unweighted. One
should hence be careful not to extend the results, and in particular the descriptive characteristics
of the sample, to the population of the cities considered. Measures of association, on the
5Data from Spain does not have a sample of children of Turkish immigrants and data from Belgium is not
available.
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other hand, like regression coeﬃcients, should not be too diﬀerent in weighted and unweighted
estimations, in particular if the sampling rate does not depend too much on the outcome variable.
Comparing the TIES sample descriptive statistics with other main surveys for the diﬀerent
countries should alleviate this concern and is an important point of the research agenda. For a
discussion on weighted against unweighted estimations, see Korn and Graubard (1995).
2.3 Parental Background and the Integration of the Second
Generation
The majority of the European second generation in the TIES are the children of the post-war
guest workers. For the most part, the guest workers had low levels of education and came from
a rural background. Given the lower educational background of their parents, the children of
immigrants may not be expected to do on average as well as the children of native-born parents.
It is crucial to compare the second generation to native children with similar background in order
to understand to which extent the diﬃculties they face are speciﬁc to migrant families. From a
policy perspective, progress on this issue should indicate whether suitable policies are policies
targeted at low educated, low income families or policies aimed speciﬁcally at the children of
immigrants.
2.3.1 The Empirical Model
In this section, I use a very simple model to analyze diﬀerences in educational and labour
market outcomes of children of immigrants and children of natives across 13 major European
cities holding family characteristics constant. The originality of the analysis is to compare
children of diﬀerent origins at the city level. The strength of the TIES survey is the very
detailed personal and family history that makes these comparisons possible at the local level.
Table 2.2 contains the means values for all variables used by ethnic group for the individual and
the parents.
I estimate models of the type:
Yi = Xiβ + Ziγ + αkSGi,k + μjCityi,j + i
Yi represents an outcome measure in education, the labour market or the marriage market
of individual . In particular, the measures used for educational achievement are: a dummy
for having attended some form of higher education; the labour market outcomes are monthly
earnings, a dummy for being employed and labour force participation for women; as a marriage
market outcome, I use a dummy to indicate whether the individual married within the ethnic
group.
SGi,k are dummy variables corresponding to each second generation group, Turkish, Mo-
roccan and ex-Yugoslav. The reference group is the children of natives.
Xi is a vector of individual characteristics and Zi of parental characteristics.
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All estimations have city dummies to capture regional variation in the outcomes considered.
In this model, there are no interactions between the ethnic group dummies and the city ﬁxed
eﬀects. The assumption made is that the slopes for each group are the same in the diﬀerent
cities. Although the assumption is strong, the results are robust to introducing the interactions.
The results of the unrestricted model are presented in tables 2.10 to 2.14 in the appendix. The
background coeﬃcients are also the same for all groups. I do not allow for diﬀerent returns
to characteristics between ethnic groups. This means that for instance, a European father’s
high-school diploma is assumed to have the same impact on the child’s probability of attending
higher education than the equivalent foreign diploma for a Turkish father. The diﬀerences in
returns will hence be captured by the second generation group dummies. Although the quality
of education varies between countries, the aim is to keep the speciﬁcations as simple as possible,
even if this implies some additional restrictions.
The individual characteristics are limited to age, gender and in some cases education. Al-
though the TIES survey has a large choice of individual variables, I want to capture the total
eﬀect of parental background and over controlling may hide part of the eﬀect.
The choice of parental background variables is also larger than in most surveys. I use
variables that account for parental educational and cultural background, family composition
and the parents’ labour market status at a prime age. Parents’ education is coded in 4 levels
corresponding to primary, lower-secondary, higher-secondary education, and higher education
(Father edu1 to Father edu4 and Mother edu1 to Mother edu4). A proxy for parents’ background
is the quantity of books (Books) owned by the household when the individual attended high-
school. This variable is coded in 5 categories: 0-10, 11-25, 26-50, 51-100, more than 100
books and has proved to be a good proxy in the education literature. Introducing this variable
helps capturing family background characteristics that may not be captured by the parents’
education. This may be particularly relevant in the case of immigrant families, as foreign
education levels are hardly comparable to the host countries. Family composition is accounted
for by the individual’s number of siblings (Siblings), which has been shown in the literature to be
relevant in particular for educational achievement. Black et al. (2005) show for Norway that not
only the size of the family matters but also the birth order. However accounting for the number
of older siblings, instead of the total number of siblings, makes no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
speciﬁcations below. The size of the family matters for most outcomes whereas the birth order
does not. Parents’ labour market situation is captured using: a distinction between high-skilled
and low-skilled occupation for the father when the individual was aged 15 (F.high-skill) ; and
the mother’s labour force participation status also at age 15 (M. labour force). It is important to
have these last two variables when the individual was aged 15, since the parents’ labour market
status at a prime working age matters a priori more than at the time of the survey when most
parents are already retired. Also for immigrants, there is often a downgrading in labour market
status upon arrival in the host country. After 15 years or more of residence, the labour market
situation of the immigrant parents should have signiﬁcantly improved and stabilized.
64
2.3.2 Results
Educational Achievement
It is among individuals who attended higher education that the children of immigrants in the
TIES sample used seem to lag behind the most signiﬁcantly. Since higher education degrees
are a ticket to the best paying jobs, this disadvantage has long term consequences for the
life cycle earnings of the second generation. I use as a measure of educational attainment,
an indicator for whether the individual attended university or some equivalent form of higher
education. Table 2.3 presents the results of a linear probability model of higher education
attendance. All speciﬁcations control for age, gender and city ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (1) presents
average diﬀerences between ethnic groups in higher education attendance for the whole sample
considered and column (2) presents these diﬀerences only for the individuals who have no missing
values for the background variables used in the model. Background characteristics are added
in columns (3) to (5). All other tables in this section are presented in the same way.
The three second generation groups in the TIES sample attended higher education less often
than natives living in the same cities. The diﬀerence is particularly large for the Moroccan
and Turkish second generation at 25 percentage points. Controlling for parental education
increases the ﬁt of the model, the adjusted r-squared goes from 0.20 to 0.26. More importantly,
parents’ education reduces the higher education attendance gap by more than half for all groups
considered. The eﬀect is particularly large for the Moroccan second generation whose parents in
the 4 cities considered have particularly low levels of education, whereas their children do much
better as shown on the summary statistics in table 2.2. Both mother and father’s education are
signiﬁcant in the model. Running a separate model for men and women shows that the mothers’
education is more relevant for the daughter’s than the son’s higher education attendance6.
The Books variable, as an extra proxy for parental background, reduces the gap further
by 4 percentage points for all groups. Family background diﬀerences not accounted for by
parents’ education thus also play a part in the educational achievement gap of the TIES second
generation. The number of siblings has a negative impact on the higher education attendance
rate. This result is in line with the education literature. As immigrant families in the sample
are on average larger than native families, family composition plays a part in explaining the
educational gap.
Finally, among the second generation, diﬀerences in the family’s integration, as captured by
the usage of the host country language, also have a signiﬁcant impact on educational achieve-
ment. Children of natives and children of immigrants with similar family background and who
mainly speak the host country language within the household have on average virtually the same
rate of higher education attendance. The average diﬀerence in higher education attendance be-
tween children of immigrant families that always speak the host country language among them
and those who never do is 12 percentage points.
6The results are not shown but are available on the demand.
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The apparently very large diﬀerences between ethnic groups in higher education attendance
in the sample thus seem to be to a large extent explained by background characteristics. Table
2.10 in the appendix presents the results for the three second generation groups in each city
with the same speciﬁcations than in table 2.37.
Labour Market Outcomes
Several labour market outcomes are analyzed in this section: wages and employment rates but
also women’s labour force participation, and occupational status, measured by a distinction
between high-skilled and low-skilled jobs.
Table 2.4 presents the results of a linear probability model of employment8. Employment
rates are lower for the second generation than for natives in the sample. Controlling for the
individual’s education level decreases the gap slightly. The family background variables are not
strong predictors of the employment rates once education has been taken into account. Separate
estimations for men and women show that the diﬀerences in employment rates are higher for
women than men, and diﬀerences in background are more important for women than men9. As
before, the diﬀerent coeﬃcients for the second generation groups by city are shown in table 2.11
in the appendix. Diﬀerences in employment rates are not strongly related to background once
education has been taken into account.
When looking at labour market outcomes for women, the labour force participation is an
important indicator. Table 2.5 presents the results of a linear probability model of labour
force participation for women in the TIES sample. Second generation women with Turkish and
Moroccan origins have on average much lower participation rates than children of natives at the
city level, 19 and 13 percentage points respectively.
Accounting for diﬀerences in education reduces the Turkish and Moroccan gap by approx-
imately one third. Second generation women from these two groups have on average lower
education and hence face a lower cost of staying out of the labour force. Parental background
explains half of the remaining gap for the Turkish second generation and the entire gap for the
Moroccan second generation10. The individual’s education decision is likely to be correlated
with the decision to participate in the labour force. For example, a woman who decides not
to participate in the labour force may decide not to complete an advanced schooling degree as
she will not get the return from the schooling investment. Also, as the individual’s education is
partly explained by the parents’ own education, the education variable may be hiding the full
7The coeﬃcients on the control variable are not shown as they are very similar to the ones in table 2.3.
8The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the individual is employed full-time at the time of the
survey and equals 0 if the individual participates in the labour force but is unemployed. Part-time workers are
excluded from the analysis.
9The results are not shown but are available on demand.
10The results for the Moroccan second generation are an average for 4 cities and those for the Yugoslav second
generation an average for 6 cities, compared to 13 cities for natives and the Turkish second generation. Introducing
interactions between cities and second generation groups allows estimating the coeﬃcients at the city level. The
results presented in table 2.12 in the appendix are robust.
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eﬀect of parental background. However, not accounting for the individual’s education in the
speciﬁcations does not have an eﬀect on the other coeﬃcients presented in table 2.511.
The coeﬃcient on the number of siblings is signiﬁcantly negative. Women from larger
families participate less in the labour force even after accounting for ethnicity. Having a mother
who participated in the labour force at her prime age is also a signiﬁcant predictor of labour
force participation of the daughter.
As for the educational outcomes results, the language index is large and signiﬁcant. Speaking
mostly the host country language within the family is associated with a higher probability for
women to participate in the labour force.
All in all, taking into account background characteristics strongly decreases diﬀerences in
labour force between ethnic groups. The results are robust to allowing for diﬀerent city eﬀects
for the diﬀerent ethnic groups. The results are presented in table 2.12 in the appendix.
Once employed, occupational status is another measure of a labour market outcome. I use
the distinction between low-skilled and high-skilled occupations. This classiﬁcation is based on
the occupation classiﬁcation, ISCO 88, at the one digit level12. Results of a linear probability
model are presented in table 2.6.
Second generation individuals have less often high-skilled occupations than the children of
natives: the diﬀerence is close to 15 percentage points for each second generation group. A
large part of this gap is linked to the lower educational attainment of the second generation.
Accounting for educational attainment strongly decreases the gap. Parental background reduces
the gap further: the gap becomes insigniﬁcant for all groups. I introduce in these speciﬁcations
a variable that indicates whether the individual’s father had a high-skilled occupation when the
respondent was aged 15 years old. The father’s occupational status is a very strong predictor
of the child’s own occupational status. Once this variable and the educational attainment have
been accounted for, parent’s education has no signiﬁcant impact on the individual’s probability
of having a high-skilled occupation.
The TIES survey does not contain detailed information on the individual’s wage, instead
respondents were asked to situate their monthly earnings in one out of ten 500 euro groups: less
than 500, between 500 and 1000, and so on, until 5000 or more. Although in Switzerland and
Sweden, the amounts are stated in Swiss franc and Swedish kronor, respectively, the earning
bands are approximately equivalent. I use the midpoints of each band as a measure for monthly
earnings. All estimations have city ﬁxed eﬀects that account for diﬀerences in prices. Very
few respondents work part-time13, less than 5% of the sample, thus only full-time workers are
considered for the estimations. Table 2.7 presents estimation results of a linear regression model
of log monthly earnings.
11The results are not shown but are available on demand.
12The occupational classiﬁcation is for the moment not available for France. This country is hence not taken
into account in these speciﬁcations.
13Individuals working less than 20 hours a week are considered to be part-time workers.
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At the city level, in the TIES sample, the Turkish and the Moroccan second generations
earn on average signiﬁcantly less than natives; whereas the children of Yugoslav immigrants
earn approximately the same than natives. Accounting for the individual’s education decreases
the group diﬀerences since, as discussed earlier, there is important between group education
variation. After accounting also for family background, the earnings gap decreases substantially
in the sample considered. The TIES survey has detailed job information. Even after controlling
for the size of the ﬁrm, the sector, the occupation at the 1 digit level and the private/public
status of the workplace, the results remain very similar to the ones in table 2.714. Separate
estimations for men and women show that the earnings gap is higher for women than men15.
Marriage Market Outcomes
The marriage of the children of immigrants to natives may be seen as an alternative measure
of social integration. In the economics assimilation literature, an alternative assimilation index
used is the rate of inter-marriage of the children of immigrants. Inter-marriage of the second
generation has been shown in the US case to be correlated to other economic assimilation
measures, see Card et al. (2000), and also to promote the second generation spouse labour
market outcomes through extended networks, see Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009). The
index considered in this section is the marriage rate within the immigrant group: the dependent
variable is one if the individual marries an immigrant from the parents’ country of origin or
a second generation from the same origin group; it is zero if the individual marries someone
whose both parents are native born16. The aim of this section is to understand to which extent
marriage decisions are correlated to family background and investigate which parents are more
likely to have children who marry outside the immigrant group.
The regression results presented in table 2.8 are obtained from a linear probability model
of the inter-marriage index described above. The regressions are run only on second generation
individuals, since the outcome measured is not relevant for the children of natives. The baseline
is now the Turkish second generation. As in the previous sections, interactions between the
second generation groups and the city eﬀects allow to compare for each city the diﬀerence in
outcomes of the diﬀerent groups. Diﬀerences in marriage rates within the ethnic group between
cities may be due to diﬀerences in the sizes of the immigrant local communities. The interactions
between the origin groups and the city eﬀects account for these potential diﬀerences17.
In the TIES sample, marriage within the immigrant group is the norm for the children
of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants but less so for the Yugoslav second generation. Women
14The results are not shown but are available on request.
15The results are not shown but are available on request.
16There are only 20 cases in the sample considered of a second generation individual marrying an immigrant or
a second generation from another origin, and 51 cases where a second generation marries someone from a country
that is neither the host country, neither one of the three origin countries. These observations are not taken into
account in the estimations.
17The model with interactions between cities and second generation groups is not shown but results are available
from the author. All coeﬃcients remain virtually the same than those in table 2.8.
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in the TIES sample are also more often married within the ethnic group. I use all the vari-
ables describing family background used in the previous models and add a dummy to indicate
whether one of the parents is native-born. The marriage choice of the parents is particularly
important in the marriage market18. In fact, having one native-born parent strongly decreases
the probability for men and women of marrying within the ethnic group. The mother’s charac-
teristics come out to be more relevant than the father’s. Education and labour market status
are important predictors of marriage decisions. Children with more educated parents and with
a working mother tend to marry more outside of the immigrant group. Family size is also posi-
tively correlated with marriage within the group: women from larger families intra-marry more
even after controlling for parental education. Separate results for men and women indicate that
background variables are more important predictors for women than for men. All the back-
ground variables are also correlated with the individual’s educational achievement. However,
even accounting for the individual’s education level, the parental background variables still have
an impact on the marriage choices. Note that in speciﬁcations that account for the individual’s
education, column (4), and speciﬁcations that ignore this variable, column (3), the coeﬃcients
on the parents’ education remain stable. The language index, as in the previous models, has a
strong eﬀect also on the inter-marriage rate. Children of immigrant families more assimilated
in terms of the host country language tend to inter-marry signiﬁcantly more. Note that this
eﬀect remains strong after controlling for having one native-born parent.
2.4 Intergenerational Assimilation
The descriptive results above show that, for quite diverse outcomes, parental background ex-
plains most of the diﬀerences between second generation groups and children of natives. The
question that arises in the intergenerational assimilation is how mobile are the children of im-
migrants compared to the natives’. Is the weight of parental background heavier or lighter in
immigrant families? In the next section, I compare the intergenerational transmission of human
capital for immigrant and native households for a set of outcomes.
A simple model of intergenerational transmission of human capital, based on Solon (1999),
may be written as follows:
Y childi = α+ βparenti + i
Y childi is an outcome of interest (related in this context to the educational or labour market
performance) of the individual surveyed in the TIES sample. Y parenti measures the same
outcome for the mother and/or the father when the child was aged 15. Ideally, the child and
the parents’ outcomes should be measured exactly at the same stage in the life cycle, say at
age 40. β is the coeﬃcient of interest, it measures intergenerational mobility, or how correlated
parent and child outcomes are. A higher β corresponds to a lower intergenerational mobility.
The constant α captures diﬀerences in mean outcomes across generations. For the estimations,
18Having a native-born parent is not signiﬁcantly correlated with the educational and labour market outcomes
presented above in the TIES sample.
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I use a slightly transformed model:
Y childi = α+ βY parenti + γkY parenti ∗ SGi,k + δkSGi,k + μjCityi,j + μj,kCityi,j ∗ SGk,j + i
The city ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with the diﬀerent ethnic groups capture regional variations in
outcomes. I do not interact city dummies with the parents’ outcomes to allow for diﬀerent rates
of intergenerational transmission at the city level. Introducing dummies for the diﬀerent origins
allows the constants in the model to diﬀer between children of immigrants of the diﬀerent origins
and children of natives. The coeﬃcients of interest in this setting are the γk: the diﬀerence
in intergenerational transmission between ethnic groups. β represents the intergenerational
transmission for natives.
Table 2.9 presents the estimations of a simple intergenerational model for diﬀerent outcomes:
higher education attendance; two occupational measures: the International Socio-Economic
Index of occupational status (ISEI)19, and the dichotomous variable for high-skilled versus
low-skilled occupation; and the labour force participation for women. In the intergenerational
assimilation literature, earnings is a more commonly used measure, however the TIES survey
does not inquire about parental earnings. The ISEI and F. high skill measures are built using
the father’s occupation when the respondent was aged 15 and are to a certain extent correlated
to earnings.
Let us start by the three ﬁrst columns in table 2.9. In all three cases, there is a high corre-
lation between the child and the father’s outcomes, between 25 and 32 percentage points. The
correlation between immigrant fathers and children’s outcomes is lower since the coeﬃcient of
interest is negative or insigniﬁcant. Some of these coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant due to high
standard error20. More research is still needed on the link between parents and children’s out-
comes but this simple model indicates that on average children and parents’ characteristics are
more strongly correlated for native families than for immigrant ones, indicating the possibility
of a greater intergenerational mobility for immigrant children.
The labour force participation of women is a diﬀerent case. Having a mother who partic-
ipated in the labour force increases the daughter’s probability of participating in the labour
force by 4 percentage points. The correlation in outcomes between generations seems stronger
for second generation women, although the large standard errors make the coeﬃcients insignif-
icant. This result would be in line with recent research on the second generation in the US.
In fact, second generation female labour market outcomes, and labour force participation in
particular, have been shown to be strongly inﬂuenced by the parents’ country of origin, see
Blau et al. (2008), and to be correlated with the labour force participation of women in the
parents’ country of origin, see Fernandez and Fogli (2009).
19This index captures the attributes of occupations that convert education into income. The index was derived
by the optimal scaling of occupation groups to maximize the indirect eﬀect of education on income through
occupation and to minimize the direct eﬀect of education on income, net of occupation (both eﬀects being net of
age). For more information, please refer to Ganzeboom et al. (1992).
20Estimations in columns (2) and (3) do not take France into account since the ISCO 88 coding is for the
moment unavailable for this country. Column (3) also does not take Austrian data into account.
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2.5 Conclusion
In all educational and labour market outcomes analyzed in the chapter, the children of Turkish,
Moroccan and Yugoslav immigrants lag behind the children of natives in 13 major European
cities.
The large educational attainment gap between children of immigrants and children of natives
at the city level is on average largely explained by diﬀerences in family background. The parents’
education levels are strong predictors of the child’s own education and both mothers’ and fathers’
educations seem to matter. The number of books in the household when the individual attended
high school has often been used in the literature as a proxy for parental background. This
variable allows accounting for diﬀerences in the child’s upbringing environment that may not be
reﬂected solely by the parent’s education levels. Introducing the number of books in the analysis
also explains part of the educational achievement gap. Comparing children of immigrants and
children of natives whose parents have similar educational levels and who grew up in a somewhat
similar environment reduces the diﬀerences in educational achievement greatly. Children from
larger families are also on average less likely to complete higher education. Among children of
immigrants, children who more often speak the host country language within the family (with
the parents and siblings) are more likely to attend higher education. The analysis has been
focused on the higher education rate of attendance as a measure of educational achievement.
Further research should investigate whether these ﬁndings also hold for alternative educational
achievement measures.
The labour force participation of second generation women is signiﬁcantly lower than the
participation of children of natives in the sample. Part of the gap in labour force participation
between the two groups can be explained by diﬀerences in educational levels. Children of
immigrants are less educated and thus opt out of the labour force more often. After accounting
for the individual’s own education level, the parents’ education is not a strong predictor of
labour force participation. The mother’s labour force participation, on the other hand, seems
to be a strong determinant of the daughter’s own decision to participate in the labour force.
Among the children of immigrants, the extent to which the host country language is spoken
within the family is again positively correlated with labour force participation.
Diﬀerences in employment rates for children of natives and children of immigrants may
partly be explained by diﬀerences in education levels. Less educated individuals have on average
lower employment rates. After accounting for diﬀerences in educational attainment of the
children, parental background seems to have virtually no eﬀect on the employment rate. Family
composition and the ﬂuency in the host country language also appear to be uncorrelated with
the likelihood of being in employment. This suggests that the impact of parental background
on children of migrants’ labour market outcomes is mainly indirect (i.e. through its impact on
educational attainment).
Once employed, children of immigrants earn lower wages and are less likely to have high-
skilled occupations than children of natives living in the same cities. Lower education levels, once
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again, partly explain the diﬀerences observed. Parent’s education and the host country language
ﬂuency are not strongly correlated with the individual’s wage or with his/her occupational
status. A notable exception is the strong correlation between the individual’s probability of
having a high-skilled job and whether the father had himself a high-skilled job at his prime age.
Nevertheless, after controlling for educational diﬀerences, the gap between children of natives
and second generation in these two labour market outcomes is (already) fairly small in the
sample.
The children of immigrants’ marriage decisions, and in particular the decision whether to
marry within the ethnic group, are correlated with parental background. Children who have
more educated parents and who were brought up in smaller families tend to marry more outside
of the ethnic group. The results also indicate that the parents’ marriage decisions are strong
predictors of the child’s own marriage patterns. Children who have one native-born parent seem
to have a much higher probability of marrying a native. Speaking the host country language
within the family is also correlated with marrying outside of the group. Other factors are
relevant for marriage decisions, such as religion and other cultural diﬀerences, and would be
worth investigating in further research.
One major concern is the extent to which the results presented above may be generalized
to the whole population of the cities considered. The introduction of appropriate weights in the
analysis and the comparison of the TIES sample with other available, albeit more general, data
sources on the European second generation should ease this concern.
The aim of the chapter was to present a broad picture of the second generation outcomes at
the European level. Results at the city level21 indicate that although the outcome gaps are of
diﬀerent magnitudes in the diﬀerent cities, the results go broadly in the same direction whatever
the European city considered. Future research should aim at understanding the speciﬁcities of
each European country and the reasons for cross country diﬀerences in the second generation
integration process.
The results suggest that there is less correlation between parents’ and children’s outcomes
in immigrant families compared with native ones. This result indicates the possibility of a
greater intergenerational mobility for immigrant children. However, intergenerational mobility
is linked to the institutional setting of a country. There are large diﬀerences between OECD
countries in the extent to which parents’ and children’s outcomes are correlated22. Or putting
it diﬀerently, children from the lowest social classes have diﬀerent probabilities of climbing the
social ladder depending on the country they live in. A better understanding of cross country
diﬀerences in intergenerational mobility more generally and how these relate to the schooling
system and labour market institutions would be a crucial next step in the research agenda
on this important issue. The second step would then be to analyze cross-country diﬀerences
between the intergenerational mobility of immigrants and native families and how these relate
to countries’ institutional settings.
21The results for the diﬀerent outcomes are presented in the appendix.
22See Corak (2006) for a comparative overview of intergenerational mobility in Europe.
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Table 2.1: Eﬀectif Numbers by City
Natives Turkish SG Moroccan SG Ex-Yugoslav SG
Amsterdam 174 149 130 0
Basel 153 141 0 122
Berlin 213 221 0 165
Frankfurt 222 210 0 170
Linz 133 130 0 160
Paris 111 110 0 0
Rotterdam 173 177 132 0
Stockolm 186 185 0 0
Strasbourg 108 165 0 0
Vienna 155 173 0 217
Zurich 133 131 0 165
Source: The TIES survey was carried out by survey bureaus under supervision of the
nine national TIES partner institutes: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute
(NIDI), Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam in
the Netherlands, the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO), University
of Leuven in Belgium; the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) in France;
the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM), University of Neuchatel
in Switzerland; the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations
(CEIFO), University of Stockholm in Sweden; the Institute for Migration Research and
Intercultural Studies (IMIS), University of Osnabruck in Germany, the Institute for the Study
of Migration (IEM), Pontiﬁcal Comillas University of Madrid in Spain, and the Institute for
European Integration Research (EIF), Austrian Academy of Sciences in Austria. For more
information on the TIES project, see http://www.tiesproject.eu/index.php/lang=en.
.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Natives Turkish SG Moroccan SG Ex-Yugoslav SG
Male (d) 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.5
Age 28.45 25.91 25.23 26.73
Ed1 (d) 0.01 0.06 0.14 0.03
Ed2 (d) 0.08 0.23 0.22 0.12
Ed3 (d) 0.5 0.58 0.42 0.73
Ed4 (d) 0.4 0.14 0.22 0.11
Siblings 1.46 2.66 4.97 1.61
Books 0-10 (d) 0.06 0.27 0.36 0.18
Books 11-25 (d) 0.12 0.29 0.3 0.28
Books 26-50 (d) 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.24
Books 51-100 (d) 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.15
Books 100+ (d) 0.42 0.11 0.05 0.15
Language Index 0 1.41 1.41 1.13
1 parent native-born (d) 0 0.05 0.06 0.1
High-skill (d) 0.6 0.43 0.4 0.32
ISEI 49.55 41.97 44.88 42.34
LFP (d) 0.87 0.7 0.72 0.82
Empl (d) 0.92 0.84 0.81 0.89
AT 0.16 0.17 0 0.37
CH 0.16 0.15 0 0.29
DE 0.25 0.24 0 0.34
FR 0.12 0.15 0 0
NL 0.2 0.18 1 0
SE 0.11 0.1 0 0
Mother ed1 (d) 0.03 0.55 0.74 0.18
Mother ed2 (d) 0.32 0.22 0.14 0.33
Mother ed3 (d) 0.47 0.16 0.11 0.39
Mother ed4 (d) 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.09
M. labour force (d) 0.63 0.43 0.26 0.69
Father ed1 (d) 0.03 0.48 0.67 0.13
Father ed2 (d) 0.19 0.22 0.12 0.26
Father ed3 (d) 0.47 0.16 0.15 0.46
Father ed4 (d) 0.31 0.13 0.05 0.15
F.high-skill (d) 0.65 0.47 0.2 0.43
FISEI 48.27 34.21 32.31 34.77
N 1761 1792 262 989
Notes: Ed1 to Ed4 are 4 dummies representing 4 levels of education: primary, lower secondary, higher
secondary and college. Mother ed1 to Mother ed4 and of the individual. Books represents in 5 categories
the number of books ownedFather ed1 to Father ed4 represent the same levels for the mother and the father
by the household when the individual was in high-school. The Language Index represents the frequency the
second generation speaks the host country language within the family at the time of the survey, the index goes
from 0 to 3. 1 parent native-born is a dummy that is 1 if the individual is a second generation and has one
parent who is native-born. High skill is a dummy that is 1 if the individual has a high-skilled occupation.
ISEI is the International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status of the current occupation based on the
ISCO 88 coding. LFP is a dummy for labor force participation de ned only for women. Empl is a dummy
for employment. M. labor force is a dummy that equals 1 if the mother participated in the labor force when
the individual was 15 years old. F. High-skill is a dummy that equals 1 if the occupation of the father when
the individual was aged 15 is considered high-skilled according to the ISCO 88 classi cation. FISEI is the the
International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI) of the father when the individual was aged
15 based on the ISCO 88 coding.
Source: TIES
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Table 2.3: Higher Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.02
(-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02)
Moroccan SG -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.05 0 0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Yugoslav SG -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.04* 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Men -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Father edu2 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Father edu3 0.06*** 0.04* 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Father edu4 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother edu2 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother edu3 0.04 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother edu4 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Siblings -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Language Index -0.05***
(0.01)
Books Yes Yes
Constant -0.20*** -0.24*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.43***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 4779 3445 3445 3445 3445
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.197 0.260 0.290 0.294
Notes: Linear probability model of higher education attendance. All speciﬁcations control
for age, gender and city ﬁxed eﬀects. See the note on Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of the
variables used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, **¡0.05, *p¡0.1.
Source: TIES
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Table 2.4: Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG -0.02 -0.08* -0.06 -0.08* -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Moroccan SG -0.10** -0.11** -0.10** -0.12** -0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG 0.06* 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Men 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Edu2 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Edu3 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Edu4 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Father edu2 -0.07*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02)
Father edu3 -0.04** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02)
Father edu4 -0.05** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02)
Mother edu2 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Mother edu3 0.03* 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Mother edu4 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Siblings 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Language Index -0.03***
Books Yes Yes
Constant 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.45***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 4156 3022 3022 3022 3022
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.065 0.090 0.093 0.095
Notes: Linear probability model of employment. All speciﬁcations include age, gender
and city ﬁxed eﬀects. See the note on Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Source: TIES
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Table 2.5: Labour Force Participation for Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.12*** -0.07** -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Moroccan SG -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.09* 0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Edu2 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Edu3 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.28***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Edu4 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.36***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Father edu2 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Father edu3 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Father edu4 -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Mother edu2 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Mother edu3 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Mother edu4 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Siblings -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
M. labour force 0.04* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02)
Language Index -0.03*
(0.02)
Books Yes Yes
Constant 0.96*** 0.99*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.78***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 2417 1689 1689 1689 1689
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.050 0.119 0.125 0.126
Notes: Linear probability model of labor force participation. All speciﬁcations control for
age and city ﬁxed eﬀects. See the note on Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *p¡0.1.
Source: TIES
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Table 2.6: High-skilled Jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.01 0.03 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Moroccan SG -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.15** -0.10 -0.07
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Men -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Edu2 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Edu3 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Edu4 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Father edu2 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Father edu3 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Father edu4 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Mother edu2 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Mother edu3 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Mother edu4 0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
F. high skill 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.03)
Siblings 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Language Index -0.04**
(0.02)
Books Yes Yes
Constant -0.25*** -0.19*** -0.09 -0.12 -0.12
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Observations 3501 2178 2178 2178 2178
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.248 0.330 0.339 0.340
Notes: Linear probability model of high-skilled job status. All speciﬁcations control for age,
gender and city ﬁxed-eﬀects. See the note on Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, **p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Source: TIES
78
Table 2.7: Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.05*** 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Moroccan SG -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.08** 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG -0.03* -0.04* -0.00 0.03 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Men 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Edu2 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Edu3 0.15*** 0.13** 0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Edu4 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Father edu2 -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Father edu3 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Father edu4 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Mother edu2 0.05* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02)
Mother edu3 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Mother edu4 0.06* 0.05*
(0.03) (0.03)
Siblings -0.01* -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
Language Index -0.02
(0.01)
Books Yes Yes
Constant 4.75*** 4.72*** 5.00*** 4.86*** 4.86***
(0.20) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Observations 3234 2415 2415 2415 2415
Adjusted R2 0.448 0.444 0.485 0.489 0.489
Notes: OLS model of the log monthly earnings, as described in the text. All speciﬁcations
control for age, age2, gender and city ﬁxed eﬀects. See the note on Table 2 for the
deﬁnitions of the variables used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, *
p¡0.1
Source: TIES
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Table 2.8: Endogamous Marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Moroccan SG -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.10***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Men -0.03* -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Edu2 0.03 0.06
(0.07) (0.07)
Edu3 0.01 0.06
(0.06) (0.06)
Edu4 -0.12* -0.05
(0.07) (0.07)
1 parent native-born -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.21***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Father edu2 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Father edu3 -0.08** -0.08** -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Father edu4 -0.09* -0.08* -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Mother edu2 -0.09** -0.09** -0.08**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother edu3 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother edu4 -0.12* -0.12* -0.10*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Siblings 0.01* 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
M. labour force 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Language Index 0.13***
(0.02)
Books Yes Yes
Constant 0.79*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.73***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 1361 887 887 887 887
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.131 0.222 0.232 0.273
Notes: Linear probability model of the marriage assimilation rate described in the text. The
reference group is the children of Turkish immigrants. All speciﬁcations control for age, gender and
city ﬁxed eﬀects. See the note on Table 2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Source: TIES
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Table 2.9: Inter-generational Mobility
Higher Education High-skill ISEI LFP
Yparent 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Yparent*Turkish SG -0.17*** -0.33*** -0.29*** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Yparent*Moroccan SG -0.46*** -0.22* -0.12 0.03
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.08)
Yparent*Ex-Yugoslav SG -0.10** -0.10 -0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant 0.53*** 0.55*** 40.09*** 0.86***
(0.03) (0.06) (2.05) (0.04)
Observations 4351 2852 1837 2330
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.244 0.189 0.075
Notes: The models are estimated with an OLS. All speciﬁcations control for gender, second generation
group, city ﬁxed eﬀects and city ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with each second generation group. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1.
Source: TIES
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Table 2.10: Higher Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG*Linz -0.07 -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.13**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Amsterdam -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.19*** -0.14*** -0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Basel -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.05 -0.01 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Berlin -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.11** -0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Frankfurt -0.10*** -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Paris -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.08 -0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Rotterdam -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.21*** -0.15*** -0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Stockholm -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.12** -0.07 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Strasbourg -0.43*** -0.51*** -0.33*** -0.26*** -0.21***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Vienna -0.12*** -0.12** -0.02 0.03 0.09*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Zurich -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.12** -0.09* -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Moroccan SG*Amsterdam -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.18*** -0.13** -0.07
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Moroccan SG*Rotterdam -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.03 0.02 0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG*Linz -0.12*** -0.09* -0.05 0.04 0.10*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Basel -0.16*** -0.12** -0.07 -0.00 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Berlin -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.10** -0.08* -0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Frankfurt -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Vienna -0.03 0.01 0.07 0.09* 0.14***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Zurich -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 4779 3445 3445 3445 3445
Notes: Linear probability model of higher education attendance. All speciﬁcations control for age,
gender, city ﬁxed eﬀects and city ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with each second generation group. The
coeﬃcients on the main variables are virtually the same than those in table 3. See the note on Table
2.2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 2.11: Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG*Linz -0.08** -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Amsterdam -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Basel -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Turkish SG*Berlin -0.02 -0.08* -0.06 -0.08* -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Frankfurt -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Paris -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Rotterdam -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Stockholm -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Turkish SG*Strasbourg 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Turkish SG*Vienna -0.08** -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Zurich -0.08** -0.08* -0.06 -0.05 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Moroccan SG*Amsterdam -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.12**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Moroccan SG*Rotterdam -0.10** -0.11** -0.10** -0.12** -0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Linz -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Yugoslav SG*Basel 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Yugoslav SG*Berlin 0.06* 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Yugoslav SG*Frankfurt -0.04 -0.07* -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Yugoslav SG*Vienna -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Yugoslav SG*Zurich 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 4156 3022 3022 3022 3022
Notes: Linear probability model of employment. All speciﬁcations control for
age, gender, city ﬁxed eﬀects and city ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with each second
generation group. The coeﬃcients on the main variables are virtually the same
than those in table 4. See the note on Table 2.2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables
used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.12: Labor Force Participation for Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG*Linz -0.15** -0.20** -0.19** -0.16** -0.12
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Amsterdam -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.15** -0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Basel -0.12* -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 0.00
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Berlin -0.26*** -0.18** -0.13* -0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Frankfurt -0.20*** -0.18** -0.15** -0.10 -0.08
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Paris -0.18** -0.18** -0.11 -0.05 -0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Rotterdam -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.17*** -0.10 -0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Stockholm -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Strasbourg -0.16** -0.17** -0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Vienna -0.22*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.15** -0.12*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Zurich 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.14*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Moroccan SG*Amsterdam -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.14* -0.02 0.01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Moroccan SG*Rotterdam -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.12* -0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Yugoslav SG*Linz -0.12* -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18** -0.15**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG*Basel -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG*Berlin -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.15** -0.12* -0.11*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG*Frankfurt 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG*Vienna 0.10* 0.14** 0.13* 0.17** 0.20***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG*Zurich 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 2417 1689 1689 1689 1689
Notes: Linear probability model of labor force participation. All speciﬁcations
control for age, city ﬁxed eﬀects and city ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with each
second generation group. The coeﬃcients on the main variables are virtually
the same than those in table 5. See the note on Table 2.2 for the deﬁnitions of
the variables used. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 2.13: High-skilled jobs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG*Linz -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.04
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Amsterdam -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.10 -0.05 -0.00
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Turkish SG*Basel -0.10* -0.13** -0.06 0.02 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Berlin -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.18** -0.15* -0.12
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Frankfurt -0.16*** -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Turkish SG*Paris 0.09 0.09 0.15** 0.19*** 0.22***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Rotterdam -0.25*** -0.12 -0.04 -0.00 0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Turkish SG*Stockholm -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.17** -0.11 -0.07
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Turkish SG*Strasbourg 0.08 0.06 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Vienna -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Zurich -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.11* 0.14**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Moroccan SG*Amsterdam -0.22*** -0.27*** -0.22** -0.16 -0.13
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Moroccan SG*Rotterdam -0.19*** -0.15* -0.12 -0.07 -0.03
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Yugoslav SG*Linz -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.14**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG*Basel -0.13** -0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Yugoslav SG*Berlin -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.14** -0.10 -0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG*Frankfurt -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG*Vienna -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG*Zurich -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.07 -0.00 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 3501 2178 2178 2178 2178
Notes: Linear probability model of high-skilled job status. All speciﬁcations
control for age, gender, city ﬁxed eﬀects and city ﬁxed eﬀects interacted
with each second generation group. The coeﬃcients on the main variables
are virtually the same than those in table 6. See the note on Table 2.2 for
the deﬁnitions of the variables used. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
85
Table 2.14: Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turkish SG*Linz -0.14*** -0.16** -0.16*** -0.13** -0.10
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Amsterdam -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.10* -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Basel -0.11** -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Berlin -0.12*** -0.13* -0.07 -0.03 -0.01
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Turkish SG*Frankfurt -0.10** -0.11* -0.09* -0.06 -0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Paris -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.10* 0.11**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Rotterdam -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.08 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Stockholm -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.09* 0.10*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Turkish SG*Strasbourg -0.12** -0.16*** -0.04 0.04 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Vienna -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.15** -0.08 -0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Turkish SG*Zurich -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Moroccan SG*Amsterdam -0.16*** -0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.08
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Moroccan SG*Rotterdam -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.05 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Yugoslav SG*Linz -0.09* -0.11** -0.11** -0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Basel 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.10* 0.12**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Berlin -0.12** -0.12** -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Frankfurt -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Vienna -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Yugoslav SG*Zurich -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 3234 2415 2415 2415 2415
Notes: OLS model of the log monthly earnings, as described in the text. All
speciﬁcations control for age, age2, gender, city ﬁxed eﬀects and city ﬁxed
eﬀects interacted with each second generation group. The coeﬃcients on the
main variables are virtually the same than those in table 7. See the note
on Table 2.2 for the deﬁnitions of the variables used. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 3
Immigrant Wage Gaps in the UK
and the US1
3.1 Introduction
The literature on immigrant assimilation has focused on measuring and explaining the immi-
grant wage penalty: immigrants with similar education and labour market experience earn less
than natives. A very robust ﬁnding in the literature is that the immigrants’ country of origin
is a strong predictor of the size of the wage gap. Holding observable individual characteristics
ﬁxed, immigrants from Canada for instance perform better in the US labour market than im-
migrants from Mexico. This result was presented in Chiswick’s early work, Chiswick (1978),
and also in Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986) and Borjas (2000), among many others.
This paper focuses on better understanding the country of origin eﬀect. The factors that
explain that the immigrants from certain countries of origin perform better in a host country
labour market than others may be classiﬁed into two wide categories. Some factors are speciﬁc
to the home country, such as characteristics of the home country that make the worker more
productive in any labour market, and some factors are speciﬁc to the home country-host country
pair. These may be linked to selection eﬀects that would explain that holding the host country
ﬁxed, immigrants from diﬀerent home countries are drawn from diﬀerent parts of the skill
distribution of the home country. Diﬀerences in host countries’ immigration policy are a factor
among others driving immigrant selection. Similar characteristics of the home and host country
labour markets may also make it easier for immigrants to adapt. This paper compares the wage
gaps by country of origin in two host countries to make an attempt at distinguishing factors
speciﬁc to the country of origin from factors linked to host country-home country pair.
Among the features of the country of origin that determine the workers’ productivity, the
literature has mainly focused on the importance of the quality of the country’s educational
system. Bratsberg and Ragan Jr. (2002) show that there is a wide dispersion in the returns to
education acquired abroad for immigrant men in the US depending on where the education was
acquired. In a related paper, Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) show in fact that there is a strong
1I am grateful to Alan Manning for suggesting the topic of this chapter and providing the data for the UK.
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correlation between the returns to foreign education in the US labour market and the quality of
the educational system of the country of origin, measured by inputs to education: the expen-
ditures per pupil and the number of pupils per teacher. Sweetman (2004) uses country average
scores in international standardized tests as a measure of de facto quality of the educational
system and ﬁnds also for Canada that the home country school quality is highly correlated to
the returns to immigrants’ foreign education. Very similar results are also presented for the
US in Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and more recently Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). The
main objective in these two papers is not to study immigrant performance but to show a causal
eﬀect of school quality on productivity and growth. Comparing the performance in the US
labour market of immigrants from the same home country who acquired their education either
in the US or in the country of origin is one of the strategies presented to isolate the eﬀect of
the quality of education on productivity. Hanushek and co-authors use scores in standardized
tests and show that these are positively related to immigrants’ productivity in the US labour
market. The home country eﬀects hence partly reﬂect diﬀerences in the quality of the home
countries’ educational systems which are not taken into account in the commonly estimated
wage regressions.
Although the quality of the educational system is the most widely studied factor, other char-
acteristics of the country of origin are also likely to explain part of the diﬀerences in productivity
across countries. Sweetman (2004) shows for instance that in Canada, among immigrants with
a low educational attainment, those from countries with the highest quality of the educational
system tend to perform worse. He argues this is due to selection into education in the country
of origin. This eﬀect is also indirectly linked to the educational system of the home country but
is independent of the causal eﬀect of schooling on individual productivity.
The second category of explanatory factors of the country of origin eﬀect relates to the
characteristics of the home country-host country pair. Firstly, the decisions to migrate and
where to migrate to (that is selection and sorting) depend on factors such as the distance between
the two countries, the relative returns to the workers’ skills in diﬀerent countries, the existing
immigrant networks, etc. Borjas (1987) builds on a Roy model to study the selection into
immigration. According to the model, workers make their decision to migrate by comparing the
diﬀerences in expected returns to skills in the host versus the home country net of the migration
costs. Migration costs are usually considered to be correlated to geographic distance between
the two countries but also to cultural distance such as how diﬀerent the languages spoken in
both countries are or whether there were colonial ties between the country of origin and the
host country in the past. Migrants are hence not randomly drawn from the skill distribution
of the home country, and, similarly, diﬀerent host countries attract immigrants with diﬀerent
skill levels. In a recent paper, Grogger and Hanson (2011) show using international migration
ﬂows into 15 OECD countries that there is positive sorting: the more skilled migrants (in the
context of the paper, the more educated migrants) go to the host countries where the returns to
skills are higher. Grogger and Hanson (2011) claim in particular that this mechanism explains
why the US and Canada receive more educated immigrants than European countries of the
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OECD such as the UK or Germany. One may imagine that this argument is valid not only
for observable formal education but also for skills that are usually unobserved and that aﬀect
the workers’ productivity. Even holding the educational level constant, there may be positive
sorting between the home and the host country.
Putting aside immigrant selection, similarities between the two countries may make it easier
for immigrant groups to integrate and make use of their skills in the host country labour market.
If the productive systems are similar in the two countries, for e.g. the economy is mainly based
on agriculture and the techniques used are the same, immigrants will be more productive in the
host country. This argument relies on the complementarities between the characteristics of the
country of origin and the host country and is independent of immigrant selection.
Most of the literature on immigrant assimilation focuses on one host country. When studying
the diﬀerences among immigrant groups this makes it impossible to disentangle the assimilation
factors that are speciﬁc to the characteristics of the home countries and those that are linked to
the home country-host country pair. Matoo et al. (2008) focus on one host country, the US, and
estimates the diﬀerences by country of origin in the likelihood to access skilled jobs for tertiary
educated migrants. The estimated diﬀerences are then correlated to variables representing
home country characteristics and variables measuring immigrant selection. The approach in
this project is similar although it uses wages as the outcome of interest instead of occupational
attainment. The major diﬀerence is that we compare immigrants from the same country of
origin in two host countries.
Another strand of the immigration literature compares immigrant performance in diﬀerent
host countries to look at the impact of diﬀerent immigration policies. However, these papers
most often do not exploit the origin of immigrants in detail and do not focus on understanding
the diﬀerences in assimilation of the diﬀerent groups. The analysis in this project relates
however to a sideline analysis made in Borjas (1991). The paper shows that the diﬀerences in
immigration policy between the US and Canada after the mid-1960’s did not act by selecting
diﬀerent immigrants from the same countries but by changing the country of origin mix of
immigrants over time. As part of the argument, Borjas correlates the mean education and the
wage gap by country of origin in the US and Canada. These two countries are very similar,
performing similar analysis with other host countries allows to better identify the country of
origin eﬀect. Moreover, Borjas does not pursue the analysis to understand the country of origin
eﬀects.
This paper brings these two strands of the literature closer together by conducting a ﬁrst
descriptive analysis of immigrant wage gaps by country of origin in two major host countries:
the UK and the US. The ﬁrst step of the empirical analysis is to correlate the wage gaps by
country of origin in the UK and in the US. The correlation is strong independently of the exact
speciﬁcation considered indicating that characteristics of the country of origin are important
in explaining the wage gaps in the UK and the US. Allowing for country of origin speciﬁc
returns to years of education in the wage regressions allows to show that the returns to years
of education are also highly correlated in the two host countries and this accounts for all the
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observed correlation in the wage gaps. Average country scores in international standardized
tests and whether the country is English speaking explain around one third of the diﬀerences in
home country returns to years of education, both in the UK and the US. Variables usually used
to measure immigrant selection, as distance between the home country and the host country,
or the size of the immigrant community in the host country, explain a smaller part of the
diﬀerences in wage gaps, specially in the UK. It remains that two thirds of the country of origin
are speciﬁc to the host country and remain unexplained.
3.2 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 The Data
The micro data for the analysis come from the labour force surveys for the two countries: the
UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the US Current Population Survey (CPS). The samples
from 2000 to 2011 (2009 for the UK) are pooled in the analysis. Immigrants are deﬁned as
foreign-born and the home country is the declared country of birth. One of the ﬁrst diﬃculties
of the empirical analysis is to identify countries of origin common in both data sets over time.
The classiﬁcation of the country of birth used is the one in the UK LFS in 2000. All foreign-born
from individual countries for which there are at least 25 observations in both data sets are kept
for the analysis. Observations for which the country of birth was classiﬁed as a region, such as
”other African countries” or ”other Europe”, are dropped, leaving a total of 72 home countries.
Immigrants from these countries represent 83% of the immigrant population aged 15 to 64 in
the UK LFS and 73% of that in the US CPS.2
An important variable in wage estimations is the educational attainment. The highest
diploma obtained is not available for individuals who obtained their degrees abroad in the UK
LFS. Instead, the survey has information on the age the individual left full-time education. This
variable is used in the analysis as a proxy for years of schooling.3 Individuals having left full-time
education after age 28 are dropped from the UK LFS sample. In the CPS, there is information
on the highest degree obtained but not on the years of schooling or on school leaving age. The
information on the degree is recoded into years of schooling. Following Bratsberg and Ragan Jr.
(2002), among others, the school leaving age is assumed to be six plus the equivalent number
of years of schooling required for the degree obtained. In the cases the data are reported in
intervals, the years of education are calculated as the midpoint of the interval. For professional
and doctoral degrees, the school leaving age is set to 26 and 28.
An important distinction in the literature is whether the education was completed in the host
country or abroad. fgnedu is a dummy variable that equals one if the immigrant completed his
education abroad. The UK LFS reports the year of arrival in the UK as a continuous variable,
2The country classiﬁcations of both surveys changed signiﬁcantly in 2007. More detail on the country of origin
has become available. However, pulling 5 years of data produces too small sample sizes. It would probably have
been best to use Census data.
3Years of schooling are usually approximated by the age the individual left full time education minus 5. In
the analysis, years of education are the age the individual graduated or left full-time education.
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whereas the CPS reports the year of arrival in intervals. The year of arrival is compared to
actual or estimated school leaving year to determine the origin of the education. In the US case,
immigrants for whom the estimated graduation date falls in the date of arrival interval have a
missing value for the fgnedu variable4.
In order to account for characteristics of the country of origin and those of the home country-
host country pair, country level variables have also been collected from several sources:
English The home country is considered to be English speaking if the CIA World Factbook listed
English as an oﬃcial language or as the most widely spoken language in the country,
following Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) among others.
Distance Data on distances between countries comes from the CEPII’s GeoDist database.5.
GDP per capita for the country of origin comes from the World Bank indicators. The
data collected is for 2009 or the latest year available.
Test The measure of the quality of schooling used is one developed in Hanushek andWoessmann
(2009). They use test scores in standardized international tests from 1964 to 2003 to
construct cross-country comparable measures of cognitive skills for diﬀerent age groups
over time. The measure used in this project is the average test score in math and science,
for all education levels from primary through the end of secondary school for all years
available. The measure is scaled to the PISA test scores (mean 500 and standard deviation
100 across OECD countries) divided by 100.6
Size An approximation of the size of the immigrant community from a given home country in
the host country is given by the sample size of immigrants from the home country in the
labour force survey samples used.
3.2.2 Immigrants in the UK and in the US
Tables 3.1 to 3.4 present the means of the main variables for all individuals considered in the
analysis by country of birth in the UK and in the US. The last two columns represent for each
country of origin, the sample size and its share of the total immigrant population in the sample.
The shares of immigrants and their duration of stay give a rough picture of the main
immigration waves into the US and the UK. Immigrants in the UK after the Second World
War come traditionally from other states of the Common Wealth (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
West Indies, Kenya) and from Western Europe (Ireland, Germany, France). More recently, the
enlargement of the European Union brought a change in the most represented communities in
the UK. According to OECD (2012), in 2010, the second largest inﬂow of migrants to the UK
was from Poland, just after India. Immigrants to the US before the 1960’s came mainly from
4The construction of this variable with the CPS data follows Bratsberg and Ragan Jr. (2002)
5For more details on diﬀerent measures of distances available, please refer to Mayer and Zignago (2011)
6For more details on the construction of the variable, refer to Appendix B in Hanushek and Woessmann
(2009).
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North-Western Europe (UK, Ireland, Germany) but there was a shift in the country of origin of
immigrants after the immigration policy change in 1965 emphasizing family reuniﬁcation. The
US immigration policy and its impact on the composition of the immigrant population over
time has been much debated in the literature (ex. Borjas (1991), Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986)
or LaLonde and Topel (1997)). The weight of immigrants from Asia has increased since the
1970’s and that of Western Europe decreased. Mexico represents by far the largest community
among the immigrant population.
Comparing mean educational attainment by country of birth in the UK and the US should
give a ﬁrst idea of how the immigrant selection process compares in the two countries. Is the
educational attainment of immigrants from the same country of origin similar in the UK and
the US? Graphic 3.1 shows the correlation between the years of education of immigrants by
country of origin in the UK and the US. The correlation is 0.28 and is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level.
Borjas (1991) performs a similar exercise comparing 5 year cohorts of immigrants in the US
and Canada between 1960 and 1980, using Census data (1971 and 1981 for Canada and 1970
and 1980 for the US). Borjas (1991) ﬁnds a stronger correlation than above. Regressing the
mean education of immigrants in the US on that of Canada, he ﬁnds that the intercept and
the slope are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 and 1 for most immigrant cohorts.
Regressing the mean years of education of immigrants in the UK on that of immigrants in the
US yields a constant of 14 and a slope of 0.30, both signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 and 1. The
R2 of the regression is 6%, compared to an R2 between 0.45 and 0.78 depending on the cohort
considered in Borjas (1991).7. Although it is diﬃcult to make comparisons as the data used in
this exercise is much more recent than the one used in Borjas (1991) and mainly because all
cohorts are pooled in the analysis, the diﬀerence indicates that the immigrant selection process
may be more diﬀerent between the UK and the US than between Canada and the US.
The average years of education is higher for immigrants in the UK than in the US. This is
partly, or perhaps totally, due to the way the years of education are calculated in the two data
sets. In the UK LFS, the years of education represent the years spent in the educational system
whereas in the US, they are the equivalent in years to the highest degree obtained. Immigrants
in the UK are also reported to have spent more years in education on average than natives, it
is however not clear whether this reﬂects into higher educational achievement.
The mean education of an immigrant group is related to selection: self-selection of individu-
als choosing to migrate to the host country but also the selection imposed by the host country’s
immigration policy.
Bratsberg and Ragan Jr. (2002) show that the educational attainment of immigrants in the
US who acquired their education abroad is positively correlated to the GDP of the country of
origin, to distance to the host country and whether the country of origin is English speaking.
OECD (2008) also shows for a larger number of home and host country pairs that the share
of immigrants with tertiary education is negatively correlated to the size of the home country
7Dropping 5 countries that are strong outliers from the regression increases the correlation to 0.43. The
coeﬃcient of the regression becomes 9.3 and the slope 0.51 The R2 is 0.17
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community in the host country.
Table 3.5 presents, separately for the UK and the US, the coeﬃcients from regressions of the
mean years of education by country of origin on several variables believed to impact immigrant
selection. One concern when analyzing diﬀerences between immigrant groups in the US is the
weight of immigrants from Mexico. In all group estimations, Mexico is excluded from the
analysis for the US. Table 3.16 in the Appendix presents the results including Mexico.
Using all variables in the regressions accounts for 50% of the cross country variation in
immigrant mean education in the US but only for 30% in the UK.
As in the literature mentioned above, distance between the home and the host country is
positively correlated to the education of immigrants in the UK and in the US.8 The size of
the home country community is negatively correlated to the years of education. However, this
results only holds for the US when Mexico is included. GDP per capita has a diﬀerent impact
in both host countries: it is positively correlated with years of education in the US but not in
the UK. Likewise, immigrants from English speaking countries are on avergae more educated
than other immigrant groups in the US but less educated in the UK. Countries of origin from
where a higher proportion of immigrants completes education before migration have lower mean
education in the US but not in the UK.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis is performed in two steps. First, the wage gap by country of origin
is estimated using the UK and the US micro data separately. Then, the home country mean
wage gaps are regressed on variables accounting for characteristics of the home country and for
variables at the home country-host country level.
3.3.1 The Wage Gap in the UK and in the US
This ﬁrst section presents preliminary results of the estimations of log wage regressions for the
UK and the US, pooling all foreign-born workers of all countries of origin.
The equation estimated is:
log(wi,t) = Xi,tβ + FBi + δt
where log(wi,t) is the log hourly wage of individual i in year t. FB is a dummy for foreign-
born. Xi,t are individual characteristics, such as gender, age, years of education, race, and years
the immigrant has spent in the host country. Race is a dummy variable which indicates if the
individual is the race of the majority of the native population, white. Years since migration are
introduced as three dummy variables: 5 years or less (ysm1), 5 to 10 years (ysm2) and 10 years
or more (ysm3). Indicators for regions and time (δt) are also included in all the speciﬁcations.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the results for the UK and the US. The coeﬃcients and R2 of
the regressions are very similar for the UK and the US, although the immigrant wage gap is
8This results is robust to excluding Australia and New Zealand in the UK estimations.
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signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Controlling for gender, race and a cubic in age, immigrants earn 8 log
points less than natives in the UK and 24 log points less in the US. Not controlling for diﬀerences
in race, the gaps are 12 log points in the UK and 25 log points in the US. Taking into account
diﬀerences in education, the gap increases to 21 log points in the UK and decreases to 11 log
points in the US.9 This result reﬂects the lower mean education of immigrants in the US as
shown in the previous section. Allowing for diﬀerent experience proﬁles for men and women or
restricting the sample only to men makes little diﬀerence to any of the results in the paper.10
An important explanatory factor of the immigrant wage penalty is the heterogeneity in
returns to foreign education. This result is shown for instance in Bratsberg and Ragan Jr.
(2002) or in Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) for the US. The last column introduces diﬀerent
returns to years of education for immigrants educated abroad. The returns to education in
the host country are restricted to being the same independently of the country of birth of the
worker. The wage gap decreases to 7 log points in the UK and +0.4 log points in the US,
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. An extra year of education acquired abroad has on average a
lower return than one years of education in the host country by 0.9 log points in the UK and
0.7 log points in the US.
3.3.2 The Country of Origin Eﬀect in the UK and in the US
The Wage Gap by Country of Origin
In order to calculate the wage gaps by country of origin, the immigrant dummy is replaced
by country of origin ﬁxed eﬀects in the speciﬁcations above. Graphics 3.2 and 3.3 show the
correlation between the estimated home country eﬀects in the two host countries for the ﬁrst
two speciﬁcations above, that is, with and without taking into account years in education.
Tables 3.12 and 3.14 in the Appendix show the estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors for
the country of origin eﬀects, for the UK and the US.
The graphs show a strong correlation between the home country eﬀects in the two host
countries. Three quarters of the countries in the ﬁrst tier of countries that have higher average
wages are the same in both host countries. Between a third and a half are countries from
North-Western Europe and most others are English speaking countries such as Canada, New
Zealand, Australia and South Africa. Among the worse performing countries are countries
from Eastern Europe (more so in the UK), and also countries from Asia, such as Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Vietnam, Thailand or the Philippines. Controlling for years of education changes the
ranking of some countries but the overall picture remains the same. North-Western European
countries and settlement countries are still at the top of the rankings. Some exceptions for
individual countries are Mexico in the US: accounting for the low mean education of Mexican
workers brings Mexico from the last position to about two-thirds of the ranking. The low
wages of Portuguese immigrants are also strongly correlated to their educational background:
accounting for education moves the Portuguese gap from rank 64, out of 72, to rank 11 in the
9Not accounting for diﬀerences in race, the gaps become 26 and 12 log points.
10The results are available on request
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US.
The correlation between the wage gap by country of origin in the UK and the US estimated
from the two speciﬁcations above is 0.49 and 0.53, both signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Regressing the mean wage gaps in the UK on the wage gaps in the US, the slope is 0.62 and
the constant is -0.02 for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, and 0.91 and -0.11 for the second speciﬁcation.
The R2 is 29% and 32%. In the main speciﬁcation, which controls for years of education, the
hypothesis that the slope is 1 can not be rejected at conventional levels.11
The negative constant indicates that the wage gap for a given country of origin is always
more negative in the UK than in the US. This is not the case in the speciﬁcation that does not
control for education. On average immigrants in the UK have more years of education than in
the US but receive lower returns to an extra year of education. As mentioned in the previous
section, education is measured diﬀerently in the two labour force surveys, which can partly or
fully drive the results. The CPS has information on the highest degree obtained which is likely
to be more comparable in terms of productivity in the labour market than the age the workers
left full-time education available in the UK LFS.
The speciﬁcations estimated mirror the one made in the previous section comparing the
mean education in both host countries and has also been done in Borjas (1991) for Canada and
the US. Borjas (1991) shows that the constant and the slope are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0 and 1 for all the 5 year cohorts of immigrants from 1960 to 1980. The R2 increases a lot from
0.17 for the 1960-64 cohort to 0.89 for the 1975-80 cohort. Again, it is diﬃcult to compare the
Borjas (1991) results with the ones presented above since we have not introduced cohort eﬀects
in this exercise.
The second step of the analysis is to try to understand which factors explain the diﬀerences
in labour market performance between countries of origin in the UK and the US. I regress
the gaps by country of origin estimated with the micro data on variables that reﬂect either
characteristics of the country of origin or variables linked to the selection of immigrants. Table
3.8 presents the results of the estimations for the UK and the US for the gaps estimated taking
into account the years of education. The variables considered are ﬁrst the distance between
the country of origin and the host country, and the size of the home country community in
the host country. These variables are associated with immigrant selection to the host country,
as discussed above when analyzing the selection on immigrants’ education. A bigger distance
between home and host country increases the cost of migration and makes it only worthwhile
for individuals with the highest expected returns to migration to actually migrate. Often these
are believed to be drawn from the upper part of the skill distribution of the home country. A
strong country of origin community in the host country on the one hand decreases the cost of
migration, which may be an incentive for less productive workers to migrate; on the other hand,
larger networks may be beneﬁcial in terms of integration and having access to higher wages
11The results of the same analysis excluding race from the estimations are very similar. The correlation between
the gaps by country of origin in the UK and in the US is nevertheless stronger, 0.60 in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation and
0.63 in the second. This indicates that part of the correlation in wage gaps by country of origin in the two host
countries is explained by the race penalty. All results are available on request.
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in the host country labour market. The eﬀect is hence ambiguous. Coming from an English
speaking country makes transferring skills between the two countries easier and is expected to
have a positive sign on immigrant performance. The mean test scores on standardized tests are
a measure of the quality of the educational system in the country of origin that should directly
positively correlate with the immigrants’ productivity. All estimations exclude Mexico for the
US, as it has a very large weight on the regressions and is often an outlier. Results including
Mexico are presented in the Appendix.
The larger the distance between the home and the host countries, the more positive is the
gap for the US and the UK. This would indicate the usual selection mechanism. However, the
result is driven by Australia and New Zealand in the UK. Excluding these two countries from the
analysis changes the sign of the coeﬃcient. Distance does not seem to have the same selection
eﬀect in both host countries. The size of the home country community is positively related to
immigrant performance. However this variable is positively correlated with the English speaking
country of origin variable. When using all variables in the same speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient
becomes negative in both the UK and the US. The negative selection eﬀect documented for
the mean educational attainment of immigrants by home country seems to be also at play in
terms of labour market performance once education has been accounted for. Immigrants from
English speaking countries suﬀer lower wage penalties as expected, and the mean test scores in
standardized tests also have a positive impact in both host countries.
The characteristics of the home country play a similar role in explaining the country of
origin eﬀects in both host countries. The explanatory power of all variables taken together is
nevertheless much lower in the UK than in the US, 0.28 versus 0.65.
The last step of the analysis is to compare the gaps in the UK and in the US in the same
framework. The estimation now pools the wage gaps by country of origin in the two host
countries and regresses them on country of origin ﬁxed eﬀects, host country ﬁxed eﬀects and
selection variables. This estimation also allows to compare the relative eﬀect of home country
characteristics in the UK and the US by interacting the home country characteristics with the
host country ﬁxed eﬀect. The results are presented in table 3.9. This estimation conﬁrms that
the distance eﬀect is positive in both host countries but the coeﬃcient is higher in the US. The
size of the immigrant community is positive on average but this eﬀect seems driven by the US.
Speaking English brings higher beneﬁts in the US than in the UK, whereas the home country
mean test scores are more positively associated with immigrants’ wages in the UK than in the
US.
The Returns to Education
As mentioned in the previous section, diﬀerences in returns to education have been shown to be
an important explanatory factor of the country of origin eﬀect. Allowing for diﬀerent returns to
years of education acquired abroad in the wage estimations decreases the correlation between
the wage gaps by country of origin in the UK and the US to -0.04, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
0. The estimated returns to education acquired abroad by home country are highly correlated
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in the UK and the US. The correlation is 0.37, signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Graphic 3.4
shows the correlation between the returns to foreign education in the two host countries.
The second step of the analysis is again to regress the estimated returns to education on
the home country characteristics and on the variables at the home country-host country level.
Considering ﬁrst the home country characteristics, whether the country is English speaking and
the mean test scores in international standardized tests, the R2 obtained are similar for both
host countries: 24 for the UK and 25 for the US. Adding distance and the size of the home
country community increases the R2 by approximately one ﬁfth to 31 for both countries. The
eﬀect of distance is negative for both countries if Australia and New Zealand are again excluded
in the UK estimation. On average, the two home country variables seem to have very similar
eﬀects in the UK and the US. However, more than two thirds of the cross-country diﬀerences
in returns to education remain unexplained.
Pooling again the estimated gaps in the UK and the US in table 3.11 shows that the selection
variables are more relevant in explaining diﬀerences in returns to education by country of origin
in the US than in the UK. As for the estimated wage gaps, the country of origin’s mean test
scores in international tests are more important in explaining cross country diﬀerences in returns
to education in the UK than in the US.
3.4 Conclusion and Further Work
This paper compares the immigrant wage penalty by country of origin in two major host coun-
tries and tries to better understand the explanatory factors of the country of origin eﬀect. The
correlation between the wage gaps by country of origin in the UK and the US is very strong
showing the importance of the country of origin eﬀect. A large part of the country of origin
eﬀect is linked to diﬀerences in returns to years of education across countries of origin. Measures
of the quality of the educational system of the home country and whether the country is En-
glish speaking are important predictors of the wage gaps and of the country speciﬁc returns to
years of education. Variables used in the literature to measure immigrant selection are weaker
predictors of immigrants’ labour market performance in both host countries, but even more so
in the UK. A large part of the country of origin eﬀects are speciﬁc to the host country, to the
UK and to the US, and remains unexplained.
A ﬁrst step forward in the analysis would be to collect better data. The main concern
with using labour force surveys is small samples. Not all countries of origin of immigrants were
considered in the analysis because of very small samples; although the countries of more than
80% of immigrants in either host country are taken into account. Nevertheless, larger samples
would allow the estimations to become more precise and to re-do the analysis by immigrant
cohort. For now, all immigrant cohorts have been pooled together and the wage regressions
control only for the years spent in the country. Being able to compare the same cohort of
immigrants in the UK and the US would make the comparisons cleaner and would allow to
exploit an extra source of variation: the changes over time in immigrant selection and home
country characteristics. Using Census data instead of labour force surveys may allow to improve
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the analysis in this way.
Cross country diﬀerences in returns to years of education are shown to be very relevant in ex-
plaining the immigrant wage gap in both host countries. However it was mentioned throughout
the analysis that the years of education are measured diﬀerently in both countries which may
impact the results. Re-doing the analysis with the information on the highest degree obtained
in the UK would allow a closer comparison of the estimations in the two countries.
An important aspect when studying the returns to education of immigrants and natives is to
take into account the fact that the returns to years of education may be non linear. In general,
there are lower returns at lower levels of education. If the years of education of immigrants
are lower than the natives’, then using years of education in a linear speciﬁcation tends to over
estimate the diﬀerences in returns to education between immigrants and natives, and hence to
over estimate the wage gap. This is shown to be true for the US in Bratsberg and Ragan Jr.
(2002). Once we have a comparable measure of education in both host countries, it will be
possible to explore more ﬂexible speciﬁcations and check whether the main results change in
any way. A situation in which the results may change is if immigrants from a given country of
origin, for example Mexico, have higher mean education in the UK than in the US. The wage
gaps for Mexicans in the US is over-estimated and this may decrease the estimated correlation
between the Mexican wage gap in the two countries.
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Figure 3.1: Immigrants’ Education
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Notes: The graphic shows the correlation between the mean age the immigrants left full-time
education by country of origin in the UK and the US. The correlation is 0.28 and is signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level.
The line represents the 45 degree line.
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Figure 3.2: The Wage Gap
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Notes: The wage gaps are estimated from a regression of log hourly wages on country of origin
dummies, controlling for gender, race, a cubic in age, region and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The corre-
lation is 0.49, signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The line represents the 45 degree line.
100
Figure 3.3: The Wage Gap (controlling for education)
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Notes: The wage gaps are estimated from a regression of log hourly wages on country of origin
dummies, controlling for gender, race, a cubic in age, years of education, region and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. The correlation is 0.53, signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The line represents the 45 degree line.
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Figure 3.4: The Returns to Education
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Notes: The returns to education are estimated from a regression of log hourly wages on country
of origin dummies and age left full-time education interacted with the country of origin dummies,
and controlling also for gender, race, a cubic in age, age left full-time education, region and year
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Belarus is excluded from the graphic as it is a strong outlier in the UK estimation.
The line represents the 45 degree line.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics UK (1/2)
cb edage fgnedu ysm1 ysm2 ysm3 sex age race percent size
ireland 17.79 0.62 0.12 0.08 0.80 0.48 45.39 0.10 8.80 6065
australia 19.62 0.69 0.43 0.16 0.41 0.49 35.65 0.04 3.30 2271
canada 20.02 0.40 0.24 0.15 0.61 0.46 39.42 0.06 1.84 1271
new zealand 19.65 0.80 0.40 0.17 0.42 0.53 37.46 0.06 1.59 1093
kenya 19.13 0.35 0.08 0.07 0.85 0.55 43.74 0.86 3.85 2655
uganda 19.58 0.37 0.08 0.09 0.83 0.56 43.73 0.91 1.52 1050
ghana 19.78 0.76 0.25 0.18 0.55 0.52 40.63 0.95 1.86 1279
nigeria 20.99 0.73 0.27 0.19 0.54 0.52 39.89 0.91 2.65 1829
sierra leone 19.17 0.70 0.16 0.27 0.57 0.42 40.56 0.93 0.33 229
barbados 17.57 0.44 0.06 0.07 0.87 0.54 48.43 0.92 0.39 267
jamaica 17.07 0.45 0.11 0.11 0.78 0.42 45.55 0.97 2.58 1776
trinidad and tobago 18.80 0.59 0.16 0.17 0.66 0.41 43.29 0.85 0.62 428
guyana 18.80 0.54 0.17 0.09 0.74 0.45 46.67 0.93 0.37 258
bangladesh 18.33 0.49 0.23 0.21 0.56 0.80 34.96 0.99 2.88 1982
india 19.59 0.66 0.27 0.13 0.60 0.58 41.60 0.94 11.52 7935
sri lanka 20.01 0.71 0.24 0.20 0.55 0.64 40.79 0.94 2.03 1397
hong kong 18.78 0.37 0.15 0.12 0.73 0.52 40.34 0.72 1.99 1371
malaysia 20.24 0.43 0.22 0.10 0.68 0.48 41.75 0.72 1.38 951
singapore 18.25 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.89 0.47 41.11 0.22 1.32 910
morocco 19.89 0.80 0.27 0.13 0.60 0.66 39.89 0.69 0.27 187
egypt 19.98 0.49 0.17 0.10 0.74 0.67 47.67 0.48 0.58 398
south africa 19.57 0.71 0.46 0.23 0.31 0.50 35.77 0.15 4.98 3432
pakistan 18.25 0.58 0.22 0.18 0.59 0.79 38.36 0.99 5.43 3739
burma 19.87 0.43 0.15 0.11 0.74 0.64 46.72 0.75 0.16 107
china 20.64 0.77 0.45 0.23 0.31 0.46 36.74 0.97 1.20 824
japan 21.49 0.82 0.47 0.19 0.34 0.51 39.55 0.90 0.57 391
philippines 20.04 0.95 0.50 0.21 0.29 0.32 38.53 0.98 2.28 1573
vietnam 18.89 0.54 0.12 0.18 0.70 0.60 37.61 0.97 0.33 230
iran 21.66 0.54 0.19 0.15 0.66 0.67 42.04 0.70 0.99 683
israel 20.59 0.65 0.30 0.11 0.59 0.64 40.53 0.17 0.25 175
belgium 20.51 0.50 0.32 0.18 0.50 0.54 36.85 0.05 0.48 329
denmark 20.58 0.68 0.34 0.22 0.44 0.42 38.21 0.05 0.42 292
france 21.39 0.71 0.42 0.22 0.36 0.42 35.61 0.09 2.50 1722
italy 18.88 0.68 0.25 0.16 0.59 0.57 41.92 0.04 2.18 1502
netherlands 21.01 0.71 0.35 0.16 0.49 0.51 39.48 0.06 1.08 744
germany 18.66 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.64 0.48 36.75 0.03 6.66 4588
Notes: The variables are the country of birth (cb); the age left education (edage); a dummy for whether the education was
completed abroad (fgnedu); a dummy variable which indicates if the individual is white (race); years since migration are three
dummy variables: 5 years or less (ysm1), 5 to 10 years (ysm2) and 10 years or more (ysm3); the proportion of immigrants from
the same country of birth in the sample (percent); and the sample size (size).
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics UK (2/2)
cb edage fgnedu ysm1 ysm2 ysm3 sex age race percent size
bulgaria 21.04 0.87 0.58 0.30 0.12 0.47 35.32 0.10 0.43 296
czechoslovakia 20.06 0.76 0.44 0.26 0.29 0.34 36.22 0.09 0.14 97
hungary 20.23 0.83 0.65 0.08 0.27 0.45 36.39 0.09 0.36 245
poland 20.40 0.92 0.83 0.09 0.08 0.55 31.37 0.09 5.41 3730
romania 20.13 0.92 0.69 0.20 0.11 0.55 32.44 0.09 0.45 310
austria 19.38 0.49 0.22 0.15 0.64 0.49 45.22 0.03 0.35 244
switzerland 20.59 0.63 0.31 0.15 0.54 0.43 40.54 0.05 0.27 186
greece 21.13 0.63 0.42 0.20 0.38 0.61 35.73 0.09 0.56 386
portugal 16.56 0.84 0.40 0.21 0.38 0.52 37.42 0.16 1.51 1043
spain 20.27 0.78 0.40 0.19 0.41 0.46 36.59 0.07 1.38 948
ﬁnland 21.61 0.77 0.48 0.19 0.33 0.26 36.12 0.02 0.29 197
norway 20.95 0.59 0.36 0.18 0.45 0.43 38.54 0.09 0.29 199
sweden 20.97 0.71 0.50 0.19 0.31 0.43 35.98 0.04 0.52 359
yugoslavia 19.75 0.83 0.25 0.37 0.39 0.65 36.43 0.09 0.37 256
turkey 17.97 0.79 0.30 0.26 0.44 0.71 35.57 0.30 1.05 724
ussr 22.41 0.83 0.62 0.27 0.11 0.44 35.02 0.13 0.07 45
ethiopia 20.30 0.70 0.19 0.26 0.56 0.53 37.87 0.86 0.20 135
somalia 18.02 0.71 0.37 0.38 0.25 0.62 32.70 0.99 0.34 237
mexico 21.94 0.71 0.40 0.22 0.38 0.41 37.31 0.40 0.15 105
argentina 21.00 0.67 0.38 0.21 0.42 0.53 39.87 0.13 0.20 141
brazil 20.00 0.80 0.62 0.15 0.23 0.46 33.53 0.32 0.75 515
chile 20.45 0.70 0.24 0.11 0.66 0.38 43.89 0.33 0.13 93
colombia 19.53 0.86 0.32 0.27 0.40 0.42 37.93 0.63 0.36 251
venezuela 21.09 0.53 0.35 0.16 0.49 0.55 39.36 0.28 0.10 69
iraq 20.36 0.68 0.28 0.24 0.48 0.79 38.72 0.77 0.58 402
lebanon 20.12 0.59 0.17 0.17 0.66 0.78 40.91 0.51 0.24 162
korea 23.03 0.85 0.53 0.26 0.21 0.52 38.42 0.97 0.16 109
belarus 20.92 0.96 0.64 0.29 0.07 0.43 33.04 0.00 0.04 28
lithuania 19.09 0.94 0.83 0.15 0.02 0.52 31.21 0.16 0.78 539
latvia 18.88 0.90 0.79 0.15 0.06 0.47 32.37 0.09 0.26 177
ukraine 21.20 0.87 0.53 0.32 0.15 0.36 35.35 0.15 0.29 197
sudan 21.84 0.75 0.25 0.30 0.45 0.74 39.94 0.87 0.17 120
indonesia 20.97 0.72 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.46 37.87 0.80 0.14 99
bermuda 18.41 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.61 0.32 39.39 0.11 0.04 28
taiwan 22.39 0.70 0.51 0.17 0.29 0.34 35.57 0.94 0.05 35
thailand 18.34 0.77 0.42 0.17 0.41 0.24 37.05 0.93 0.39 268
Natives 17.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 40.23 809154
Foreign-born 19.35 0.62 0.30 0.15 0.54 0.54 39.25 68908
Notes: The variables are the country of birth (cb); the age left education (edage); a dummy for whether the education was
completed abroad (fgnedu); a dummy variable which indicates if the individual is white (race); years since migration are three
dummy variables: 5 years or less (ysm1), 5 to 10 years (ysm2) and 10 years or more (ysm3); the proportion of immigrants from
the same country of birth in the sample (percent); and the sample size (size).
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics US (1/2)
cb edage fgnedu ysm1 ysm2 ysm3 sex age race percent size
ireland 20.44 0.66 0.07 0.14 0.76 0.59 43.90 0.01 0.36 459
australia 20.77 0.55 0.21 0.18 0.58 0.62 38.70 0.05 0.24 306
canada 20.51 0.42 0.10 0.14 0.74 0.50 41.88 0.08 2.76 3555
new zealand 20.75 0.70 0.14 0.21 0.58 0.53 40.78 0.11 0.10 125
kenya 20.81 0.62 0.20 0.32 0.44 0.58 36.38 0.92 0.26 334
uganda 20.89 0.66 0.11 0.39 0.47 0.64 40.86 0.97 0.03 36
ghana 20.06 0.81 0.17 0.30 0.48 0.59 40.63 0.97 0.41 526
nigeria 21.41 0.69 0.19 0.23 0.53 0.61 40.53 0.95 0.59 765
sierra leone 19.69 0.87 0.10 0.36 0.48 0.55 40.05 0.98 0.03 42
barbados 19.82 0.55 0.03 0.09 0.87 0.39 44.89 0.96 0.20 262
jamaica 19.02 0.59 0.07 0.14 0.76 0.42 42.39 0.95 2.08 2674
trinidad and tobago 19.45 0.59 0.04 0.14 0.79 0.44 43.10 0.87 0.70 898
guyana 19.09 0.62 0.07 0.17 0.73 0.51 41.49 0.85 0.75 966
bangladesh 21.00 0.71 0.13 0.27 0.54 0.72 38.53 0.93 0.38 491
india 22.11 0.67 0.21 0.25 0.48 0.63 38.39 0.92 5.16 6643
sri lanka 21.39 0.75 0.10 0.15 0.73 0.53 41.11 0.98 0.05 62
hong kong 20.64 0.37 0.05 0.10 0.82 0.52 41.29 0.95 0.65 831
malaysia 21.26 0.55 0.11 0.22 0.62 0.49 38.97 0.94 0.21 274
singapore 20.89 0.64 0.13 0.17 0.63 0.52 39.63 0.88 0.08 104
morocco 20.11 0.71 0.22 0.23 0.51 0.69 39.63 0.16 0.17 217
egypt 21.35 0.71 0.11 0.22 0.61 0.68 42.56 0.14 0.35 456
south africa 21.08 0.64 0.14 0.26 0.57 0.50 39.35 0.25 0.25 317
pakistan 20.92 0.63 0.14 0.23 0.59 0.68 39.30 0.86 0.72 932
burma 18.61 0.78 0.25 0.27 0.47 0.58 39.52 0.96 0.22 288
china 20.65 0.71 0.15 0.23 0.57 0.50 41.50 0.98 4.11 5286
japan 20.76 0.42 0.13 0.09 0.76 0.46 41.50 0.74 1.59 2042
philippines 20.04 0.64 0.10 0.15 0.72 0.41 42.59 0.94 7.51 9663
vietnam 18.67 0.60 0.08 0.13 0.75 0.53 40.85 0.98 3.18 4097
iran 21.42 0.55 0.09 0.12 0.77 0.57 43.10 0.10 0.84 1078
israel 20.97 0.52 0.12 0.11 0.73 0.63 41.00 0.03 0.29 379
belgium 21.50 0.37 0.11 0.10 0.74 0.53 41.98 0.03 0.12 155
denmark 21.09 0.52 0.13 0.15 0.64 0.54 44.01 0.05 0.08 104
france 21.22 0.40 0.16 0.11 0.71 0.54 41.55 0.08 0.55 706
italy 19.57 0.32 0.06 0.06 0.87 0.61 45.48 0.02 0.97 1251
netherlands 20.96 0.48 0.09 0.10 0.79 0.58 45.85 0.10 0.28 360
germany 20.02 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.90 0.47 39.67 0.09 3.24 4175
Notes: The variables are the country of birth (cb); the age left education (edage); a dummy for whether the education was
completed abroad (fgnedu); a dummy variable which indicates if the individual is white (race); years since migration are three
dummy variables: 5 years or less (ysm1), 5 to 10 years (ysm2) and 10 years or more (ysm3); the proportion of immigrants from
the same country of birth in the sample (percent); and the sample size (size).
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics US (2/2)
cb edage fgnedu ysm1 ysm2 ysm3 sex age race percent size
bulgaria 21.22 0.85 0.16 0.32 0.51 0.52 36.89 0.00 0.05 63
czechoslovakia 20.90 0.59 0.20 0.16 0.61 0.53 40.49 0.01 0.20 262
hungary 20.79 0.60 0.10 0.19 0.69 0.55 43.76 0.01 0.16 201
poland 19.65 0.65 0.11 0.20 0.65 0.51 40.93 0.00 1.23 1577
romania 20.75 0.64 0.13 0.20 0.63 0.51 39.04 0.01 0.33 425
austria 20.40 0.26 0.08 0.07 0.82 0.51 46.86 0.04 0.13 169
switzerland 21.92 0.55 0.17 0.16 0.65 0.58 42.07 0.04 0.12 159
greece 19.38 0.40 0.02 0.05 0.91 0.62 46.39 0.04 0.35 450
portugal 17.00 0.44 0.04 0.06 0.90 0.51 43.65 0.05 0.86 1102
spain 20.79 0.43 0.08 0.12 0.77 0.51 39.80 0.04 0.42 537
ﬁnland 21.34 0.66 0.15 0.16 0.66 0.44 42.82 0.00 0.05 62
norway 20.95 0.41 0.13 0.07 0.77 0.54 44.17 0.03 0.09 110
sweden 21.34 0.61 0.16 0.25 0.55 0.53 40.21 0.02 0.13 165
yugoslavia 19.01 0.71 0.17 0.31 0.44 0.53 39.24 0.01 0.69 886
turkey 20.73 0.54 0.18 0.20 0.59 0.62 37.13 0.05 0.32 416
ussr 21.25 0.67 0.16 0.27 0.50 0.46 39.09 0.01 1.12 1447
ethiopia 19.54 0.75 0.23 0.25 0.46 0.54 37.16 0.93 0.50 641
somalia 17.12 0.74 0.17 0.45 0.32 0.50 32.06 0.93 0.16 204
mexico 15.31 0.71 0.14 0.20 0.62 0.66 36.35 0.04 42.43 54613
argentina 20.30 0.69 0.20 0.20 0.55 0.60 41.38 0.04 0.55 709
brazil 19.28 0.74 0.29 0.27 0.41 0.51 36.97 0.07 0.98 1262
chile 20.22 0.61 0.14 0.18 0.66 0.56 41.96 0.04 0.36 464
colombia 19.27 0.66 0.14 0.19 0.64 0.47 40.96 0.06 2.37 3049
venezuela 20.59 0.60 0.15 0.28 0.51 0.51 37.72 0.08 0.57 736
iraq 19.17 0.75 0.17 0.23 0.56 0.59 41.06 0.12 0.26 329
lebanon 20.46 0.44 0.10 0.13 0.74 0.67 38.32 0.09 0.39 499
korea 20.38 0.54 0.08 0.11 0.78 0.45 40.36 0.96 2.75 3535
belarus 20.58 0.35 0.09 0.21 0.70 0.64 33.02 0.00 0.04 53
lithuania 20.84 0.72 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.45 38.18 0.05 0.08 108
latvia 21.21 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.50 0.39 38.24 0.03 0.03 38
ukraine 20.84 0.72 0.20 0.28 0.47 0.51 39.05 0.01 0.55 711
sudan 18.18 0.81 0.20 0.33 0.44 0.72 36.22 0.88 0.06 82
indonesia 20.97 0.53 0.15 0.24 0.57 0.53 38.92 0.88 0.27 350
bermuda 20.44 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.88 0.54 41.83 0.29 0.04 48
taiwan 21.99 0.54 0.08 0.10 0.79 0.47 42.03 0.95 1.09 1405
thailand 19.04 0.48 0.08 0.11 0.78 0.40 38.17 0.91 0.76 980
Natives 19.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 38.97 936723
Foreign-born 18.16 0.63 0.13 0.18 0.65 0.57 38.95 128706
Notes: The variables are the country of birth (cb); the age left education (edage); a dummy for whether the education was
completed abroad (fgnedu); a dummy variable which indicates if the individual is white (race); years since migration are three
dummy variables: 5 years or less (ysm1), 5 to 10 years (ysm2) and 10 years or more (ysm3); the proportion of immigrants from
the same country of birth in the sample (percent); and the sample size (size).
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Table 3.6: The Wage Gap in the UK
(1) (2) (3)
Sex 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.232***
(0.00134) (0.00125) (0.00125)
Ysm2 0.0686*** 0.0642*** 0.0431***
(0.00859) (0.00844) (0.00837)
Ysm3 0.0737*** 0.126*** 0.0629***
(0.00619) (0.00612) (0.00631)
Exp. 0.0762*** 0.0767***
(0.000447) (0.000445)
Edage 0.0971*** 0.0997***
(0.000290) (0.000295)
Fb -0.0825*** -0.211*** -0.141***
(0.00490) (0.00493) (0.00520)
Age 0.213***
(0.00153)
Fgnedu -0.0331***
(0.00107)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes
Constant -1.437*** -0.489*** 1.211***
(0.0183) (0.00743) (0.00500)
Observations 570,066 550,115 550,115
R-squared 0.236 0.341 0.343
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The variables are deﬁned in table 3.1.
In column (3), the immigrant dummy represents the eﬀects at the mean
years of education.
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Table 3.7: The Wage Gap in the US
(1) (2) (3)
Sex 0.211*** 0.225*** 0.241***
(0.00142) (0.00132) (0.00101)
Ysm2 0.0135* 0.0134** 0.0204**
(0.00745) (0.00670) (0.00591)
Ysm3 0.0894*** 0.0925*** 0.120***
(0.00607) (0.00546) (0.00482)
Exp 0.0714*** 0.0692***
(0.000426) (0.000358)
Edage 0.104*** 0.110***
(0.000273) (0.000262)
Fb -0.238*** -0.106*** -0.1663
(0.00550) (0.00503) (0.00454)
Age 0.211***
(0.00160)
Fg Education -0.0364***
(0.000505)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.985*** -0.177*** 1.832***
(0.0198) (0.00793) (0.00553)
Observations 1,065,429 1,065,429 1,053,531
R-squared 0.212 0.324 0.338
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The variables are deﬁned in table 3.1.
In column (3), the immigrant dummy represents the eﬀects at the mean
years of education.
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3.A Appendix
The tables below present the estimated mean wage gap (and corresponding standard error) by
country of origin for the UK and the US. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation does not include education,
whereas the second one does.
3.A.1 More Tables
The tables below present the estimated mean wage gap (and corresponding standard error) by
country of origin for the UK and the US. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation does not include education,
whereas the second one does.
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Table 3.12: The Country of Origin Eﬀect in the UK (1/2)
cb Gap 1 SE Gap 1 Gap 2 SE Gap 2
ireland 0.036 0.011 -0.011 0.010
australia 0.201 0.014 0.092 0.014
canada 0.150 0.020 -0.025 0.019
new zealand 0.204 0.021 0.073 0.019
kenya -0.040 0.016 -0.158 0.015
uganda -0.082 0.026 -0.250 0.026
ghana -0.280 0.020 -0.423 0.020
nigeria -0.149 0.019 -0.354 0.020
sierra leone -0.292 0.047 -0.391 0.047
barbados -0.120 0.035 -0.131 0.034
jamaica -0.158 0.017 -0.114 0.016
trinidad and tobago 0.013 0.034 -0.093 0.036
guyana -0.047 0.043 -0.131 0.040
bangladesh -0.429 0.022 -0.464 0.021
india -0.085 0.010 -0.228 0.010
sri lanka -0.249 0.022 -0.409 0.021
hong kong -0.098 0.023 -0.203 0.022
malaysia 0.067 0.024 -0.116 0.024
singapore 0.004 0.021 -0.053 0.020
morocco -0.291 0.059 -0.422 0.064
egypt -0.005 0.041 -0.196 0.040
south africa 0.120 0.011 0.000 0.011
pakistan -0.295 0.015 -0.355 0.015
burma 0.029 0.090 -0.208 0.089
china -0.093 0.026 -0.315 0.028
japan 0.196 0.039 -0.054 0.037
philippines -0.252 0.014 -0.405 0.016
vietnam -0.156 0.062 -0.216 0.055
iran -0.011 0.033 -0.328 0.035
israel 0.125 0.070 -0.069 0.069
belgium 0.083 0.034 -0.109 0.031
denmark 0.182 0.038 -0.004 0.038
france 0.080 0.016 -0.150 0.016
italy -0.115 0.020 -0.223 0.019
netherlands 0.228 0.025 -0.019 0.025
germany -0.016 0.011 -0.090 0.010
Notes: The country of origin eﬀects are estimated from a regression of log hourly
wages on country of origin dummies, controlling for gender, race, a cubic in age,
region and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The second speciﬁcation controls also for years of
education.
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Table 3.13: The Country of Origin Eﬀect in the UK (2/2)
cb Gap 1 SE Gap 1 Gap 2 SE Gap 2
bulgaria -0.203 0.044 -0.448 0.045
czechoslovakia -0.068 0.070 -0.235 0.070
hungary -0.308 0.049 -0.466 0.046
poland -0.334 0.009 -0.480 0.009
romania -0.163 0.047 -0.350 0.046
austria 0.098 0.046 -0.060 0.044
switzerland 0.145 0.051 -0.064 0.052
greece 0.046 0.034 -0.149 0.032
portugal -0.386 0.019 -0.263 0.018
spain -0.060 0.021 -0.210 0.020
ﬁnland 0.156 0.047 -0.101 0.050
norway 0.103 0.046 -0.084 0.044
sweden 0.153 0.034 -0.048 0.031
yugoslavia -0.182 0.052 -0.387 0.048
turkey -0.350 0.034 -0.379 0.031
ussr -0.154 0.102 -0.463 0.109
ethiopia -0.160 0.068 -0.324 0.065
somalia -0.372 0.041 -0.335 0.054
mexico -0.068 0.072 -0.346 0.077
argentina 0.059 0.055 -0.196 0.060
brazil -0.240 0.030 -0.346 0.032
chile 0.132 0.086 -0.137 0.083
colombia -0.272 0.053 -0.379 0.056
venezuela 0.064 0.103 -0.216 0.103
iraq -0.123 0.037 -0.279 0.041
lebanon -0.128 0.077 -0.270 0.065
korea 0.053 0.089 -0.276 0.083
belarus -0.073 0.067 -0.270 0.073
lithuania -0.375 0.028 -0.436 0.032
latvia -0.354 0.041 -0.408 0.044
ukraine -0.167 0.053 -0.433 0.060
sudan -0.229 0.067 -0.501 0.070
indonesia -0.131 0.067 -0.326 0.069
bermuda 0.127 0.097 0.099 0.115
taiwan 0.024 0.096 -0.275 0.099
thailand -0.326 0.035 -0.295 0.038
Notes: The country of origin eﬀects are estimated from a regression of log
hourly wages on country of origin dummies, controlling for gender, race, a
cubic in age, region and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The second speciﬁcation controls
also for years of education.
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Table 3.14: The Country of Origin Eﬀect in the US (1/2)
cb Gap 1 SE Gap 1 Gap 2 SE Gap 2
ireland 0.004 0.040 -0.033 0.039
australia 0.196 0.045 0.102 0.042
canada 0.115 0.014 0.026 0.014
new zealand 0.129 0.063 0.045 0.056
kenya 0.039 0.034 -0.081 0.032
uganda -0.074 0.110 -0.180 0.121
ghana -0.133 0.031 -0.168 0.030
nigeria 0.016 0.028 -0.157 0.027
sierra leone -0.044 0.117 -0.114 0.119
barbados 0.012 0.039 -0.028 0.036
jamaica -0.086 0.014 -0.057 0.013
trinidad and tobago -0.045 0.022 -0.048 0.021
guyana -0.155 0.020 -0.120 0.019
bangladesh -0.161 0.035 -0.292 0.034
india 0.333 0.011 0.116 0.010
sri lanka 0.161 0.083 0.027 0.080
hong kong 0.156 0.027 0.053 0.024
malaysia 0.204 0.050 0.047 0.046
singapore 0.203 0.074 0.085 0.063
morocco -0.236 0.054 -0.232 0.050
egypt -0.140 0.039 -0.283 0.036
south africa 0.168 0.044 0.034 0.041
pakistan 0.018 0.025 -0.112 0.023
burma -0.160 0.044 -0.050 0.046
china 0.012 0.012 -0.076 0.011
japan 0.132 0.017 -0.010 0.016
philippines 0.019 0.009 -0.082 0.009
vietnam -0.108 0.012 -0.053 0.011
iran -0.021 0.026 -0.168 0.023
israel 0.004 0.039 -0.078 0.037
belgium 0.122 0.067 -0.040 0.062
denmark 0.154 0.062 0.019 0.056
france 0.064 0.030 -0.056 0.027
italy -0.125 0.021 -0.097 0.020
netherlands 0.139 0.042 0.014 0.040
germany -0.042 0.012 -0.094 0.011
Notes: The country of origin eﬀects are estimated from a regression of log hourly
wages on country of origin dummies, controlling for gender, race, a cubic in age,
region and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The second speciﬁcation controls also for years of
education.
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Table 3.15: The Country of Origin Eﬀect in the US (2/2)
cb Gap 1 SE Gap 1 Gap 2 SE Gap 2
bulgaria -0.092 0.092 -0.186 0.081
czechoslovakia -0.066 0.050 -0.157 0.044
hungary -0.027 0.038 -0.113 0.034
poland -0.155 0.018 -0.137 0.017
romania -0.017 0.038 -0.102 0.036
austria 0.044 0.054 -0.031 0.053
switzerland 0.103 0.061 -0.060 0.061
greece -0.143 0.036 -0.094 0.034
portugal -0.266 0.024 0.000 0.022
spain -0.012 0.030 -0.089 0.028
ﬁnland 0.056 0.089 -0.062 0.091
norway 0.197 0.080 0.092 0.070
sweden -0.012 0.066 -0.148 0.070
yugoslavia -0.219 0.026 -0.163 0.024
turkey -0.114 0.038 -0.182 0.035
ussr -0.017 0.019 -0.147 0.018
ethiopia -0.168 0.028 -0.191 0.027
somalia -0.197 0.056 -0.038 0.056
mexico -0.536 0.005 -0.153 0.005
argentina -0.100 0.030 -0.138 0.027
brazil -0.275 0.022 -0.214 0.022
chile -0.208 0.034 -0.256 0.029
colombia -0.314 0.014 -0.273 0.013
venezuela -0.067 0.029 -0.135 0.027
iraq -0.332 0.038 -0.300 0.036
lebanon -0.060 0.033 -0.115 0.031
korea 0.034 0.014 -0.074 0.013
belarus 0.000 0.074 -0.105 0.068
lithuania -0.138 0.059 -0.235 0.052
latvia 0.022 0.116 -0.112 0.116
ukraine -0.078 0.027 -0.183 0.026
sudan -0.071 0.118 -0.018 0.117
indonesia 0.093 0.040 -0.036 0.037
bermuda 0.029 0.074 -0.120 0.063
taiwan 0.251 0.020 0.019 0.019
thailand -0.127 0.024 -0.128 0.024
Notes: The country of origin eﬀects are estimated from a regression of log
hourly wages on country of origin dummies, controlling for gender, race, a
cubic in age, region and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The second speciﬁcation controls
also for years of education.
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3.A.2 Including Mexico in the US speciﬁcations
The tables below present the estimated mean wage gap (and corresponding standard error) by
country of origin for the UK and the US. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation does not include education,
whereas the second one does.
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